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ABSTRACT 
 
 
KANTIAN MEADOWS: A JUST NURSING HOME GROUNDED IN THE 
CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE 
 
By 
 
Faith Bjalobok 
 
 This dissertation examines the structures of contemporary nursing homes and 
argues that the structure is conducive to the objectification (treatment of a human being 
as a non-person) of nursing home residents. In order to eliminate the potential for 
objectification, this project employs the Kantian categorical imperative as its theoretical 
framework. Based on that framework Kantian Meadows is created as an example of a just 
nursing home. 
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Preface 
 
 
 As I finally sit down to write my dissertation, I realize that I have reached the last 
milestone in what has been, for me, a life long quest for an understanding of justice. It is 
a quest, which for me, began as a patient in a state mental hospital and has continued 
through my employment in various “total institutions.”   The quest for an understanding 
of justice brought me to philosophy and to write this particular dissertation.  
 Like many others who have either experienced or witnessed injustice, I too am 
driven by a passionate desire to in some way further the cause of justice. My choice of a 
philosophical path is largely due to the influence of Dr. Paul Edwards and Dr. Will 
Aiken.  
 Although Kantian ethics is often criticized as being purely formal, I found in 
Kant’s writings an understanding of the anger I felt towards what I perceive as grave 
injustices carried out against individuals confined in “total institutions.” My decision to 
focus on the nursing home is the result of the four and a half years I spent as a certified 
nursing assistant. Of all the “total institutions” in which I have been either confined or 
employed I am most haunted by what I see as the systematic degradation of the 
individuals who are confined in our nation’s nursing homes. Although nursing homes 
profess in theory to be places of caring, I would argue that in practice they are places of 
degradation. 
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Chapter One 
The Nursing Home and the Ethical Problem of Objectification  
Project Overview 
 My aim in this dissertation is to argue for the following thesis:  Nursing homes 
are unethical in the strong philosophical sense of the term because they erode autonomy, 
personhood, and human dignity, and the end formulation of the Kantian categorical 
imperative can provide a theoretical framework for creating a just nursing home. In order 
to develop the above stated thesis I will argue for six distinct but inter-related 
propositions. 
First, the structure and characteristics of nursing homes create an environment 
conducive to objectification. Second, objectification is a moral evil. Third, the care 
perspective does not offer an adequate framework for addressing the problem of 
objectification.  Fourth, based on Kantian ethics we have an indirect duty to treat non-
rational persons “as if they were persons.” Fifth, the end formulation of the categorical 
imperative which instructs us “never to treat humanity as a mere means, but always as an 
end in itself” suggests guidelines for developing a just nursing.   Sixth, those guidelines 
have practical applications in developing nursing home guidelines and procedures. The 
above-mentioned propositions will be developed in the following chapters. 
In Chapter One, I will develop Propositions One and Two. That is, I will examine 
the characteristics and structure of nursing homes in order to shed some light on the 
precise sense in which nursing homes are unethical. In other words, I will illustrate the  
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way in which the characteristics and practices of nursing homes contribute to the 
objectification of nursing home residents. I will also examine various literatures from a 
variety of academic disciplines in order to establish the sense in which objectification is a 
moral evil. 
In Chapter Two, I will develop Proposition Three. That is, I will demonstrate the 
way in which the care perspective is inadequate in terms of addressing the problem of 
objectification. This will be accomplished based on an analysis of the basic precepts of 
the care perspective and their application to the Kennedy Project on Aging.   
In Chapter Three, I will develop Propositions Four and Five. In developing 
Proposition Three, I will argue that we have an indirect duty to treat non-rational humans 
“as if they were persons.”  My position is that this indirect duty is analogous to our 
indirect duty to refrain from cruelty to animals. Next I will develop Proposition Four. In 
other words, I will argue that we have a duty both not to lie, coerce, deceive or 
manipulate nursing home residents and to avert potential obstacles to individual 
autonomy.   
 Finally, in Chapter Four I will develop Proposition Six and apply the principles 
and guidelines implied by the end formulation of the categorical imperative to the 
creation of Kantian Meadows. This chapter will develop guidelines and procedures that 
uphold the duties imposed upon nursing homes by the end formulation of the categorical 
imperative.  
Introduction 
 The nursing home is supposed to be a place for the long term care of the 
physically and mentally incapacitated members of our society. However, rather than 
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viewing the nursing home as a place of care, the elderly often view the nursing home 
with repugnance.  In a society, such as contemporary America, which is built on the 
Enlightenment principles of freedom and individual autonomy, the idea of confinement in 
a nursing home creates fear. The elderly are frequently afraid that their dignity may be 
forfeited along with their freedom. Therefore, the claim can be made that many of our 
elderly the citizens are more fearful of confinement in a nursing home than of death. 
    In light of the fact that this is a work in applied ethics, the reader should note 
that I am not speaking of the elderly in abstraction but rather of flesh and blood 
individuals.  For example in 1999, 1.6 million elderly individuals were long term 
residents of America’s nursing homes, while another 2.5 million were discharged after 
only a short term stay (Barton, 2003).  It is the experience of the long term residents of 
nursing homes that I am concerned with in this work. Given that focus, certain  
sociological implications can be drawn from my philosophical analysis of the nursing 
home.  
Besides my status as a philosopher, I have been both a certified nursing assistant  
and an instructor in several nursing school programs. Based on that experience, I have 
frequently heard the following comments in relation to possible confinement in a nursing 
home. “I do not want to spend my last days in a nursing home. Just let me die at home 
with my dignity.” “They treat me like I am not a person,” is a common complaint.  It is a 
view that I myself hold after having worked as a nursing assistant for 4 ½ years.  It is also 
a view that is commonly held by the practicing nurses in my bioethics classes.  The 
nursing home is viewed with repugnance even though Medicare, Medicaid, and private 
insurance companies annually pay out enormous sums of monies to nursing homes for 
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the care of the elderly. Why is it the case that despite enormous financial investment and 
government regulations in nursing home care our elderly citizens often find their 
experience of the nursing home dehumanizing?  It is my position that this view is based 
in large part on the fear of becoming objectified and the consequent loss of one’s dignity.  
 My overall goal is to identify the characteristics of the nursing home which lead 
to the erosion of personhood and provide, based on Kantian ethics, some practical 
suggestions for a possible resolution of the problem of objectification. In other words, it 
is my intention to provide the ethical framework for the development of a specifically 
Kantian nursing home. I believe this project is of value because despite our best policy 
efforts and financial commitment to the care of the elderly the erosion of self that occurs 
among those confined within our nation’s nursing homes remains a primary ethical 
concern in gerontology. 
The Nursing Home 
Organizational Structure and Staffing 
 In the beginning of the 20th century Americans died of acute illnesses. However, 
with the advent of medical technology many more elderly Americans are living longer 
and longer with disabling chronic illnesses. Socioeconomic changes in American life 
such as increased life expectancy and more women working outside the home have 
created a demand for a long term care provision in our health care system.  Phoebe 
Barton (2003) defines long term care (LTC) as “an array of services provided in an array 
of settings to individuals who have lost some capacity for independence due to injury, 
chronic illness or condition” (p.349).  The determination that an individual requires LTC 
is made based on two standard measures: ADL (activities of daily living) and IADL 
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(instrumental activities of daily living). ADLs include such things as bathing, eating, 
mobility, and ability to utilize bathroom facilities. IADLs include such things as 
preparing meals, doing housework, paying bills, and taking medications (Barton, 2003). 
It is estimated that about 12 million Americans require LTC (Barton, 2003). It is 
significant to note that LTC is provided in a variety of settings by both formal and 
informal caregivers. Also, that about 50% of those requiring LTC are below the age of 65 
(Barton, 2003).  
 The nursing home is only one aspect of LTC, but in 1999 nursing homes were the 
place of residence for 1.6 million elderly recipients of LTC. (Barton, 2003)  Nursing 
homes are classified as either “skilled” or “intermediate” care providers depending on the 
medical needs of its residents. They are distinct from acute care, such as hospitals, 
because they provide long term care for an indefinite period for those suffering from 
chronic illness or debilitating accidents. Although they may employ occupational and 
speech therapists, the primary care givers are nurses and certified nursing assistants. The 
organizational structure of the nursing home includes the nursing home administrator 
who has a business background, the director of nursing who oversees all aspects of 
nursing care, a medical doctor who acts as the house doctor, charge nurses who oversee 
the nursing department on a given shift, medication nurses, treatment nurses, certified 
nursing assistants, social workers, an activities director, dining services, maintenance 
workers, and cleaning personnel. Of these individuals the floor nurses and certified 
nursing assistants provide direct patient care. As George Agich (2003) points out, the 
workers themselves are often exploited. This seems to be more of a concern in for-profit 
nursing homes because accumulating capital is the bottom line.  Because of staffing 
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shortages, nurses often work mandated double shifts with minimal staffing. Their jobs 
include providing assistance with ADLs and IADLs and frequently being the recipient of 
verbal and physical abuse from the residences. However, from the perspective of this 
dissertation the exploitation of nursing home workers is significant only insofar as it 
contributes to the objectification of the nursing home resident.  
 Federal guidelines establish the employment criteria for direct care staff as well as 
others. Nurses are required to have a RN or LPN certificate and licensure. Certified 
nursing assistants are required to undergo training and must be licensed. State laws, based 
on an equation which divides the number of residents by the number of staff, establish the 
number of hours of care required for each resident.  Although most states require from 
2.3 hours and upward, it has been observed that residents may receive as little as 1.7 
hours of care per day (Barton, 2003).  
 Largely due to understaffing, the physical nature of the job, the pay rate, and 
mandatory overtime, there is a high turnover rate of employees, particularly nursing 
assistants. There is also a significant amount of physical and verbal abuse of residents by 
nursing staff, enough in fact, that the law requires mandatory reporting of abuse and 
criminal background checks for employees.  
 In summary the nursing home’s primary function is to provide both skilled and 
unskilled nursing care to residents who lack varying degrees of independence.  Beginning 
in the 1960’s with the advent of Medicare and Medicaid, the nursing home became 
increasingly regulated by the federal government. Yearly surveys are conducted by State 
Departments of Aging to guarantee that state and federal regulations are upheld.  Despite 
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the numerous state and federal regulations, legal practices specializing in nursing abuse 
continue to grow in number along with newspaper reports of abuse and neglect. 
 
Nursing Home Residents 
 As previously stated the residents of nursing homes are individuals who through 
illness or accident have lost some degree of independence and require LTC.  A majority 
of nursing home residents are elderly and suffer from a variety of chronic disabilities. 
Some of those illnesses include stroke, cancer, and various forms of dementia. Alzheimer 
patients are increasing in number and are generally housed on separate units of a nursing 
home because of the special problems they present in terms of care and confinement. 
With respect to autonomy and cognitive ability, nursing home residents range from those 
capable of fully autonomous actions to those, such as PVS (persistent vegetative state) 
residents, who lack any capacity for autonomy.  Nursing home residents also require 
various forms of medical technology from simple feeding tubes and oxygen concentrators 
to dialysis machines and respirators. For the most part those in need of LTC will spend 
the remainder of their lives confined to a nursing home because of their physical or 
mental dependence either on technology or nursing staff. In light of that fact, I contend 
that the primary ethical concern is to ensure that they retain their dignity and do not 
become victims of objectification.  
Chapter Outline 
          The primary goals of this introductory chapter are as follows. First, I will define 
objectification as it applies to this dissertation. Second, I will discuss the moral evil of 
objectification. Third, I will review the relevant bioethics literature. Fourth, I will discuss 
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my contribution to the ethical discussion in this area by identifying three characteristics 
of nursing homes which I hold are major contributing factors that create an environment 
conducive to objectification.  Finally, I will argue that an unpacking of the “ends” 
formulation of the Kantian categorical imperative provides a theoretical framework for 
the creation of a just nursing home. 
Objectification 
  For the purpose of this dissertation objectification refers to any circumstance in 
which a human being is treated as if he or she were a non-person. When the latter occurs,  
the individual is seen as an object that lacks dignity and autonomy. This notion of 
humanity or personhood is of course a Kantian way of understanding personhood. For 
those who reject the Kantian idea of personhood, it is my hope that this dissertation may 
convince them of the value of deontology. Although the Kantian concept of personhood 
is not universally endorsed, I believe that adopting a Kantian concept of personhood is 
both appropriate and justifiable within the context of contemporary American society.  
Martha Nussbaum (1995) identifies seven notions that she claims can be involved 
in the idea of treating a person as an object: 
1. Instrumentality: The objectifier treats the object as a tool 
of his or her own purposes. 
2. Denial of autonomy: The objectifier treats the object as 
lacking in autonomy and self-determination. 
3. Inertness: The objectifier treats the object as lacking in 
agency, and perhaps also in activity. 
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4. Fungibility: The objectifier treats the object as 
interchangeable (a) with other objects of the same type, 
and/or (b) with objects of other types. 
5. Violability: The objectifier treats the object as lacking in 
boundary-integrity, as something that it is permissible to 
break up, smash, break into. 
6. Ownership: The objectifier treats the object as something 
that is owned by another, can be bought or sold, etc. 
7. Denial of subjectivity: The objectifier treats the object as 
something whose experience and feelings (if any) need 
not be taken into account (p.257). 
Although Nussbaum is writing in an attempt to refute some of Dworkin’s claims 
regarding objectification in sexual relationships, all of her notions can be applied to the 
treatment of nursing home residents. It should be noted that for the purposes of this 
dissertation the presence of any of Nussbaum’s notions of objectification is sufficient to 
make a claim that the individual is being treated as an object. In addition, paternalism is a 
form of objectification under this definition because it includes a denial of autonomy. 
Further, for my purposes personhood is the opposite of objectification. 
 Based on my experience as a certified nursing assistant, I have observed that 
objectification occurs within the context of several types of relationships that are 
commonplace in a nursing home setting.  The first relationship is between staff and 
residents.  A resident of a nursing home is often perceived and treated by the staff as 
either a product on an assembly line or as the patient’s  disease, e.g. the train wreck, the 
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vegetable. An incident which I witnessed while I was working as a certified nursing 
assistant provides an illustration of treating an individual like an object. An elderly man 
whose variety of health issues required that he be turned and repositioned every two 
hours to avoid the development of decubitus ulcers was in fact developing decubitus 
ulcers.  In order to determine that he was being repositioned, the nursing home 
administrator attached a post-it sticker on the man’s back which read “When you turn 
him come and see me.”  The administrator as objectifier was clearly treating the man as a 
tool for her own purposes. I was so outraged when another nursing assistant told me 
about the incident that I ran to her office and began lecturing her on the moral evils of 
treating a person as a means.  Of course it fell on deaf ears. That particular incident 
persuaded me to shift my dissertation focus away from the treatment of prison inmates to 
the treatment of nursing home residents.  I came to feel the nursing home residents were 
actually experiencing a greater degree of degradation and objectification than prison 
inmates. Unfortunately, unlike prison inmates who can riot if pushed too far the frail 
nursing home residents are truly defenseless.  
  The view of the resident as an assembly line commodity is perhaps best 
understood within the language of nursing assistants discussing their daily assignments. 
“How many do you have today?” How many are showers?  How many are weighs?”  The 
resident is no longer a person or an individual, but instead she or he becomes an assembly 
line commodity to be dealt with in a timely and efficient manner. They are a job to be 
completed.  
The second relationship in which objectification may occur is between the 
resident and his/her physician. Again I have a vivid memory of an incident which 
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occurred while I was working as a certified nursing assistant. A woman who was 
virtually paralyzed from the neck down with the exception of one hand developed an 
infection in her contracted hand.  The infection was of course the result of inadequate 
care. The orthopedic surgeon she saw suggested to her that she couldn’t use the hand so 
he might as well just amputate it. She refused. In discussing the incident with me, she 
explained that she had feelings, and he had made her feel like a piece of meat.  For 
whatever reasons, physicians often tend to deny the autonomy and subjectivity of long 
term care patients. They speak to staff and family about the medical condition of the 
residents without even acknowledging their presence. This is of course both a denial of 
autonomy and subjectivity and in this sense the physician becomes an objectifier. 
 The relationship between a resident and his or her family can also result in 
objectification of the nursing home resident. Once an individual reaches a state of 
diminished autonomy and a family member is granted proxy consent the resident is often 
treated as if he or she is the property of his or her family. In this circumstance it is the 
wishes of the family that are honored.  The resident’s own wishes are pushed aside and 
she is forced to abide by the decisions of her family. Another incident which I witnessed 
as a nursing assistant demonstrates this concept of ownership; an ownership which I 
would argue is derived from an abuse of proxy consent. An elderly gentleman who had 
suffered a stroke which left him confined to a wheelchair loved to feed the birds. 
However, his wife forbade the staff to let him go outside and feed the birds. There did not 
seem to be any legitimate reason to deny his wish to feed the birds except for his wife’s 
objections.  Obviously in this case the individual’s desires and wishes are ignored as if 
they were non-existent. The ethical question as I see it hinges on the question of how and 
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why his wife’s wishes take precedence over what is in the best interest of the patient.  
That is to say how does proxy consent become an expression of property rights? 
Still another example of abuse of proxy consent that remains vivid in my mind 
also occurred while I was working as a certified nursing assistant.  A woman I frequently 
cared for and had grown fond of vehemently objected to wearing her dentures. She had 
lost considerable weight and they were in fact too big for her. She attempted to rid herself 
of them in various ways, including wrapping them in napkins and throwing them in the 
trash. Despite her best efforts, however, they were returned time and again and on her 
daughter’s insistence they were glued into her mouth with Polident denture adhesive. 
Ultimately, I decided to dispose of them myself in the Giant Eagle dumpster. The woman 
admittedly had diminished cognitive capacity but she was alert and oriented. Yet her 
daughter was able to control every aspect of her life simply because she had proxy 
consent. The woman had become an object of her daughter’s complete control with no 
regard for her desires or wishes.  
 Finally residents as a result of the perception others hold of them and their 
diminished physical and mental abilities may begin to deny their own subjectivity. They 
become in Hill’s terms (1973) servile. His notion of a servile person “is one who tends to 
deny or disavow his own moral rights” (p.699).  Hill’s notion of a servile person will be 
discussed in greater detail latter. In this circumstance the individuals begin to objectify 
themselves in the sense that they themselves see themselves as less than a person. 
I believe that the above-mentioned family scenarios frequently occur because we 
as a society mistakenly view family relationships from a Leave it to Beaver perspective. 
In other words, we view the family as a caring loving entity that makes decisions in the 
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best interest of the family member. Therefore, there are very few regulations placed on 
the decisions that can be made by the individual with proxy consent with regard to the 
care and treatment or lack of for a nursing home resident. The consequence of this 
frequently mistaken perception of the family often leads to an unregulated use of proxy 
consent that all too often leads to the objectification of the nursing home resident. People 
become things to do with as the individual with proxy consent desires.  Good care and 
respectful treatment is contingent on the existence in this case of benevolent staff and an 
individual with proxy consent who attempts to act in place of and on behalf of the 
resident.     
 The Moral Evil of Objectification 
 There is a substantial amount of literature both philosophical and non-
philosophical dealing with the moral evil of objectification. In order to illustrate my point 
that objectification is an intrinsic evil, I have drawn on a wide variety of literature which 
addresses the issue of objectification.  I have intentionally chosen to review literature that 
addresses differing aspects of human relationships and differing notions of 
objectification. While they differ in content the common thread among them is the claim 
that objectification results in loss of dignity and self-respect. The question of 
objectification and the loss of self-respect and dignity occur in the writings of such 
diverse authors as Immanuel Kant, Thomas Hill, Jr., Erving Goffman, W.E. B. DuBois,  
and Andrea Dworkin, to name only a few.  
 Kant in the Ground Work of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) argued: 
“Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the 
person of any other, never simply as a means, but always as at the same time as an end 
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“(p33).  This formulation of the categorical imperative assumes Nussbaum’s notions of 
instrumentality and denial of autonomy as forms of objectification. To treat persons as 
means for Kant is to deny their rationality, dignity and intrinsic value. To treat persons as  
ends requires that we respect their autonomy and subjectivity.  Objectification violates 
what Kant (1785) has called the ultimate principle of morality and as such it is a moral 
evil.  The objectifier is acting immorally. 
 In Servility and Self-Respect, Hill (1973) develops the Kantian theme that we 
have duties to ourselves. Hill (1973) defines the servile person as “one who tends to deny 
or disavow his own moral rights because he does not understand them or has little 
concern for the status they give him” (p.699). In arguing that servility is a moral vice, 
Hill introduces three examples of servility: Uncle Tom, Self-deprecator, and the 
Deferential Wife. Hill argues that Kant equates respect for persons with respect for moral 
law. The moral defect of servile individuals is that they fail to respect themselves and 
therefore to respect others. In Hill’s argument there are various notions of objectification, 
but for our purposes it is Self-deprecators who deny their own subjectivity that holds the 
most significance. That is because the conditions of the nursing home are such that it is 
often the case that a resident becomes a Self-Deprecator.   
 In arguing that institutions can create certain types of individuals Goffman (1961) 
in Asylums introduces the concept of “mortification of self.” He contends, “that total 
institutions disrupt or defile precisely those actions that in civil society have the role of 
attesting to the actor  and those in his presence that he has some command over his 
world-that he is a person with “adult” self-determination, autonomy, and freedom of 
action” (p.43) Although Goffman (1961) was not directly speaking of nursing homes, he 
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defined a total institution, “as a place of residence and work where a large number of 
like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of  time, 
together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life” (p. Xii). Clearly this 
definition includes the contemporary nursing home. Therefore, it is plausible to argue that 
the same characteristics Goffman observed at St. Elizabeth’s and other total institutions 
would apply to the nursing home. 
 Goffman noted that admission to a total institution results in a severance from 
one’s civil self. A process of mortification is one in which the severance from one’s self 
can result in anxiety and psychological stress. However, it should be noted that he did 
observe relief based on that severance in some guilt ridden individuals. According to 
Goffman, the new self that emerges is an institutional self. In other words, the mental 
hospital creates the mental patient and the civil self becomes the institutionalized self 
who lacks autonomy and control of his/her world. Likewise the nursing home creates the 
nursing home resident whose personhood is eroded as a consequence of that severance 
with his/her civil self. 
 In another area of human interaction and reflecting on the plight of African 
Americans in white America, DuBois (1903) in The Souls of Black Folk recounts a story 
of his youth in which a white girl refused the greeting card he offered her simply because 
he was black. DuBois suggests that this created a veil around the white world which shut 
him and other blacks out. It created a “double consciousness” which forced him to see 
himself through the eyes of the white world: a world in Nussbaum’s terms that denies his 
autonomy and subjectivity. DuBois argues that this creates a prison around the black man 
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which in some individuals results in hopelessness and a feeling of degradation. The white 
world as objectifier rejects the black man’s autonomy and subjectivity. 
 While DuBois addressed the unequal relationship between blacks and whites,  
Dworkin  (1974) in Woman Hating  suggests that once there is an initial denial of 
autonomy, instrumentalization and ownership occur and a woman’s “body is a body, in 
the same way that a pencil is a pencil, a bucket is a bucket” (p.62)  The woman becomes 
an object; a non-autonomous being. She is a thing, an object to be owned and possessed. 
This objectification robs her of her dignity and personhood. 
 In spite of the fact that the above-mentioned authors phrase their articles in 
different perspectives (philosophy, sociology, and feminist literature), there is a common 
agreement among them that objectification is a moral evil because it harms innocent 
individuals by de-humanizing, degrading, and robbing them of their dignity. Therefore, if 
it is the case as I have claimed that objectification occurs within the nursing home then 
we as society have a moral imperative to address and resolve the characteristics of 
nursing homes that create an environment conducive to objectification.  
Bioethics Literature 
 Most of the bioethics literature that addresses nursing homes does not specifically 
address the issue of objectification, but rather focuses solely on the notion of autonomy. 
This is understandable for two reasons. First, since the Helsenki Declaration and the 
Nuremburg Code, the primary ethical concern in western medicine has been voluntary 
informed consent, which assumes the autonomous nature of the individual. Second, the 
Belmont Principle of respect for persons drawn from Kantian ethics has been reduced to 
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respect for autonomy. Therefore, discussions about autonomy hold a central place in 
bioethics discussions.  
 George Agich’s (1993) Autonomy and Long-Term Care and his revised work 
Dependence and Autonomy in Old Age (2003) remain the seminal work on addressing the 
issue of autonomy in long term care.  Agich suggests that there is a dissonance between 
the liberal view of the autonomous independent person and the frail dependent elderly 
long term care resident. He argues that what is needed is a phenomenologically re- 
interpreted view of autonomy that is applicable to long term care and includes 
dependence as an aspect of autonomy.  In developing his ethical framework for long term 
care, Agich wants to shift the focus of autonomy away from the liberal view of 
independence to the actual long term care setting where he sees dependence as a part of 
autonomy. Therefore, Agich’s work is not so much an analysis of the nursing home and 
its characteristics that foster the erosion of personhood, but rather he argues that perhaps 
a new notion of autonomy is needed in the area of long term care. 
 Another equally significant work in the area of long term care and autonomy is  
Charles Lidz, Lynn Fischer, and Robert Arnold’s  The Erosion Of Autonomy In Long-
Term care (1992).  The authors provide an observational study of two types of long term 
care and suggest that the organizational structure of the institutions leads to the erosion of 
autonomy. They like, Agich, believe that what is needed is a fundamental re-thinking of 
our notion of autonomy as it applies to long term care.  Like him, they also provide 
concrete suggestions on ways to increase the autonomy of elderly long term care 
residents.     
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 Both of these works provide invaluable suggestions on increasing autonomy 
among the elderly confined in long term care facilities and I will address them in detail in 
Chapters Three and Four.  Because their focus is primarily on autonomy, they tend to do 
two things. First, they neglect the other notions of objectification. For example they do 
not address instrumentality and denial of subjectivity. Second, they wrongly reduce 
Kant’s notion of respect for persons to respect for autonomy. Further, I believe that denial 
of autonomy is too limited a notion to account for Agich’s (2003) own image of long 
term care: 
Long-term care seems to hang like a pall covering the inevitable coffin that 
awaits us all. Surprisingly in our culture it is less death than long-term care that 
strikes us as so repugnant (p.2) 
Repugnant I agree, but it is more than just denial of autonomy that results in 
repugnance. Rather I would argue that it is the objectification of the nursing home 
resident in all Nussbaum’s notions of objectification that results in repugnance. It is a 
denial of the resident as a subject or person who has lived a life full of experiences. It is a 
denial of the nursing home resident as a unique person one who is not interchangeable 
with other objects and who has boundaries which it is wrong to violate. I contend that it is 
objectification in Nussbaum’s broader sense, rather than, in the narrow sense held by 
most bioethicists who reduce objectification to loss of autonomy, that creates the 
repugnance. 
 In light of my claim, I would suggest that a broader and more detailed focus on 
the characteristics of nursing homes that tend to foster not only denial of autonomy, but 
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instrumentality, violability, denial of subjectivity, and ownership, is needed to fully 
understand the repugnance that is felt.  
 
 
Cruel and Unusual Treatment 
One characteristic of the nursing home which is often ignored is the lack of a 
constitutionally guaranteed right to be free from cruel and unusual treatment.  While we 
have a concept of cruel and unusual punishment, we do not have a concept of cruel and 
unusual treatment. I was first introduced to this distinction by Jeffrie Murphy (1985) in 
his work Punishment and Rehabilitation.  The idea of cruel and unusual treatment made 
an impression on me, but I never really grasped the concept of cruel treatment until I 
worked as a nursing assistant. If one were to drag a prisoner out of bed at 3AM for a 
forced bath, a charge of cruel and unusual punishment could surely be leveled. Yet this is 
a common practice in nursing homes. No one objects because we are treating not 
punishing the resident. I believe that under the guise of treatment as a good, the wishes of 
the elderly resident are often overlooked because what competent person would not 
choose to be treated?  The lack of a concept of cruel treatment within the nursing home 
fosters a paternalistic attitude among the staff. Treatment is seen as a good. It is not the 
infliction of harm. Therefore, it is in the best interest of the resident unlike the prison 
inmate who can file a legal motion for cruel and unusual punishment, the nursing home 
resident cannot file such a claim. 
   As the Dax Cowart case (2000) clearly illustrates, treatment can be very cruel. 
Cowart was burned over 80% of his body. Against his will, he was forced to endure 
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soaking in the Clorox tank. Cowart describes the tankings: “It was like pouring alcohol 
on an open wound. All I could do was scream at the top of my lungs until I would finally 
pass out with exhaustion.” (p.380).  Even though Cowart was determined on psychiatric 
evaluation to be competent, his treatment was continued by his mother against his wishes.  
  Nursing home residents are frequently forced to undergo treatments against their 
wishes, which clearly deny their autonomy. I believe this occurs for two reasons. First, 
treatment is seen as a good. Second, nursing home residents are in most instances 
suffering from some cognitive impairment. Therefore, it is extremely easy for staff and 
family to deny any degree of individual autonomy and adopt a paternalistic attitude 
toward them and force unwanted treatments on them. 
A Theory of Scientific Management 
 In the case of for-profit nursing homes, budget cuts and bundle pricing have 
resulted in a decrease in the number of staff. Such reductions are often made based on the 
assumption that a theory of scientific management can be applied to nursing care. In 
other words a nursing home can be operated in the same manner and on the same 
principles as a factory. In this case I am referring to a theory of scientific management 
such as the one proposed by Frederick Taylor. Taylor focused on cost benefits analysis, 
efficiency, and systemization (Robbins, 1992, p. 63-64).   An example I often use in my 
bioethics class is based on an analogy with General Motors. GM can determine that it 
takes 2 minutes to tighten the lug nuts on the wheel of a new GM automobile. When this 
same sort of factory mentality is applied to the care of nursing home residents, states such 
as Pennsylvania determine that a resident is entitled to 2.3 hours of care per day. In actual 
practice this can equate to a resident- to- staff ratio of 25:1. The problem is of course that 
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people are not cars, and need more personal care.  An additional problem associated with 
the factory perspective is that understaffing creates a situation in which the resident is 
viewed as a production commodity. They are seen as a project to be completed.  A friend 
of mine who worked as a hospice nurse recently decided to switch to a nursing home. 
One major distinction between long term care and hospice care is that the hospice nurse 
can spend time with an individual patient. My friend quit the nursing home after a short 
period of time and returned to hospice care because she felt like she had been working in 
a factory and that was inconsistent with her view of the nature of nursing.  While budget 
constraints are a necessary part of providing health care, determining staffing levels on 
the factory model creates an environment in which there is an increased propensity to 
objectify the nursing home resident. 
Abuse of Proxy Consent 
 The final characteristic of the nursing home which I contend contributes to an 
environment of objectification is proxy consent. Proxy consent by definition is legally 
giving another individual the right to make medical decisions for someone who is not 
competent to make them. The problem as I see it is twofold. First, proxy consent in the 
nursing home is not restricted to medical decisions, but becomes all encompassing. Some 
individuals may not be competent to make their own medical decisions; however, that 
does not render them incompetent to make other decisions. The way that nursing homes 
are organized the person with proxy consent is free to make any and all decisions 
concerning a resident both medical and non-medical. One example of a non-medical 
decision which I previously discussed, is forbidding an elderly gentleman to feed the 
birds bread crumbs. Although it was the highlight of his day, the family member with 
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proxy consent did not find it to be an acceptable activity.  The holder of the proxy 
consent’s ability to make non-medical decisions results not only in a denial of autonomy, 
but also in a denial of subjectivity and an affirmation of ownership. The person becomes 
the property of the individual with proxy consent. This is unique to the nursing home 
because people are confined there 24 hours a day often for a long period of time. 
Therefore, every aspect of their life is subject to control by either the staff or the 
individual with proxy consent. On the contrary in other health care circumstances, proxy 
consent is limited to medical decisions. Even in the case of children it is only a temporary 
circumstance until they reach a stage in their development in which it is determined that 
they are capable of making their own decisions. 
 Another aspect of proxy consent which I found problematic in relation to 
objectification is that there are no established legal guidelines and parameters for the sort 
of decisions that can be made. The individual with proxy consent can decide to force or 
withhold treatment without any accountability. This creates a situation in which total 
control can result in an ownership notion of objectification. Although a health care 
facility can request legal intervention if a decision is deemed by the medical staff as not 
in the best interests of the resident, this is rarely done in the nursing home setting because 
for the most part people come to nursing homes to die not to get well and go home. 
Conclusion 
 Given the unique characteristics of nursing homes, i.e. lack of a concept of cruel 
treatment, understaffing, abuse of proxy consent, the diminished capacity of many of the 
residents, I believe that there exists an enormous potential for objectification of nursing 
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home residents. In light of that belief, I argue that a new ethical framework for long term 
care is not only necessary but a moral imperative.          
It is my position that the “ends” formulation of the Kantian categorical imperative 
provides the best basis for such an ethical framework. While Kantian ethics holds a 
central position in bioethics, a Kantian project of developing the guidelines and 
regulations for the daily treatment of nursing home residents is a project that has not been 
undertaken.  In the next chapter I will address what I believe are the inadequacies of 
Mary Raugust’s adoption of the care perspective as the theoretical framework for the 
development of a nursing home in relation to the issue of objectification. In the chapters 
that follow that I will argue for the adoption of a Kantian framework based on a wider 
understanding of respect for persons and finally develop “Kantian Meadows,” a nursing 
home based on the unpacking of the “ends” formulation of the categorical imperative. 
 
  
  
   
 
 
  
CHAPTER TWO 
The Problem of Objectification and the Care Perspective 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I will develop Proposition Three. In other words, I will argue that 
the care perspective does not offer an adequate theoretical framework for addressing the 
problem of objectification. This argument is developed in the following manner. First, I 
outline the basic tenets of the care perspective and identify the ways in which it differs 
from the justice perspective. Next, I examine its application in the Kennedy Aging 
Project. Based on that analysis, I argue that the care perspective is inadequate in terms of 
my project because it fosters a paternalistic attitude and abandons the language of rights. 
Based on my conclusion and a discussion of the justice perspective, I contend that the end 
formulation of the categorical imperative does provide such a framework.   
 From the perspective of this dissertation, a careful review of the bioethics 
literature reveals three significant characteristics. First, as Megan-Jane Johnstone (1999) 
points out, bioethics is essentially medicocentric. That is, its principles are primarily 
focused on the arena of physicians and grounded in the justice perspective. Therefore, the 
focus of bioethics tends to be on issues of patients’ rights, rights of research subjects, and 
the formulation of public policy guidelines for clinical care and biomedical research. 
Second, articles authored by nurses are conspicuously absent from most bioethics 
textbooks. In other words, open any college bioethics textbook and the majority of the 
articles are authored by philosophers, physicians, attorneys, and theologians.  Johnstone 
(1999) finds this problematic because nurses, in most instances, are the primary 
caregivers and she believes that they have been excluded from bioethical discussion 
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based on the false perception that nursing is merely “the hand maiden” of medicine and  
as such lacks its own professional autonomy. A further consequence of this exclusion is 
that ethical issues specific to the field of nursing are neglected. For example, how should 
a nurse respond if a patient asks if she is dying?  Other nursing issues deal with such 
questions as mandatory overtime and staffing shortages. Johnstone argues that the only 
way for nurses to play an active role in bioethics discussion is to educate themselves in 
the language of the bioethics discourse and establish the legitimate autonomy of nursing 
as an independent profession.  
            Finally, very little attention has been given to avoiding the objectification of  
nursing home residents. Rather the focus of the literature has been primarily on issues 
associated with autonomy.  I believe that these characteristics are inter-related.  Nursing 
homes are traditionally the domain of nurses and not physicians, and bioethics has 
traditionally focused on the domain of physicians.  Therefore, with the exception of 
issues regarding autonomy and patients’ rights, bioethics remains silent regarding long 
term care facilities.  An exception is the work of Mary Raugust (2000).  Raugust’s short 
essay Feminist Ethics and the Workplace Values illustrates Alison Jaggar’s (2000) 
criteria of feminist ethics and the basic principles of the care perspective in relation to her 
practical experience with the Kennedy Aging Project. Prior to undertaking a discussion of 
Raugust’s work, it is helpful to briefly discuss the basic core views of both the justice and 
care perspectives. 
Justice Perspective 
 The most prominent philosophic representatives of the justice tradition, John 
Locke, Immanuel Kant, and, more recently, John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, share two 
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core views. Each of them is committed to personal liberty and in terms of their 
methodology each of them relies on the social contract model. Together these core views 
provide the basis for individual autonomy which is one of the distinguishing features of 
the justice perspective.  Their concept of personhood is grounded in moral autonomy, 
human rights, and dignity. The focus in this tradition is placed on fairness and equality. 
Moral reasoning requires abstraction from the situation, deductive reasoning, and 
application of universal moral principles. Justice is the highest moral value. The justice 
perspective tends to emphasize the universals at the exclusion of the particulars.  
 Although there is dispute among scholars as to whether or not utilitarianism can 
accommodate rights, Mill’s Essay on Liberty with its focus on individual liberty clearly 
links Mill to the justice tradition. Further, Mary Wollstonecraft’s focus on the rights of 
women also clearly aligns her with the justice perspective (Kittay & Meyers, 1987). 
While Mill and Wollstonecraft argued for women’s rights, the work of Lawrence 
Kohlberg, which is grounded in the justice perspective, suggests that women may lack 
the same level of moral development achieved by men.   
 Kohlberg (1981) suggests that there are three stages with two levels each of moral 
development. In stage 1, the pre-conventional level, fear of punishment is the primary 
motivator. In stage 2, the pre-conventional level, the individual is an egoist who satisfies 
his/her own needs and considers the needs of others when it benefits them. In stage 1, 
conventional level, motivation is based on the good boy/good girl concept. One acts 
morally to conform. In stage 2, conventional level, the motivating factor is respect for 
authority and the existing social order. In stage 1, the post-conventional level, the 
individual is motivated by a desire to maintain the social contract. Morality is associated 
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with rights. Finally in stage 2, post-conventional level, the individual is motivated by 
conscience and universal principles of justice. 
 In Kohlberg’s studies he found that women were less likely than men to reach 
level 3 stage 2. Kohlberg’s student Carol Gilligan took exception to these findings and 
suggested that women view morality from a different perspective, which she identified as 
the ethics of care. 
Care Perspective 
 In her book, In a Different Voice, Gilligan (1977) offers empirical data that 
supports her hypothesis that the moral decision-making practices of women differ from 
those of men. Based on her studies of women she identified a six stage series marked by 
three levels of moral development. At the first level one is concerned with caring for 
ones’ self in order to survive. At the second level the focus of care is toward others and 
many women become self-sacrificing at this level and never move beyond that stage of 
moral development. At level three there is a balance between caring for ones self and 
caring for others. This is Gilligan’s highest level of moral development. 
 Unlike the justice perspective, the care perspective focuses on individual 
situations and relationships. Interconnectedness, not equality, is the primary focus. Moral 
decision making from the care perspective focuses on contextualization rather than 
abstraction. The care perspective views the self as a social self enmeshed in relationships.  
The primary goal of moral deliberation is to maintain those relationships. The highest 
moral value is virtue rather than justice. Its focus is on interdependency and dependency 
rather than independence. The care perspective fosters nurturing rather than respect for 
individualism. Particulars tend to be emphasized at the exclusion of the universals.  
 28
 Diane Michelfelder (2004) in her article on technology and feminism provides the 
following summary of the care perspective: 
 Like interpersonal ethics, feminist ethics (particularly the ethics of care) places 
 Particular value on our relationships with those with whom we come into 
 face-to-face contact in the context of familial and friendly relations. Its key 
 insight lies in the idea that the experience of looking out for those immediately 
 around one, an experience traditionally associated with women, is morally 
 significant, and needs to be taken into account by anyone interested in developing 
 a moral theory that would be satisfactory and useful guide to the moral dilemmas 
 facing us in all areas of life (p.277). 
Michelfelder’s account of the ethics of care illustrates the importance that the care 
perspective places on relationships in actual situations and its focus on caring for others 
as a moral imperative. 
 Although Gilligan based her contentions regarding the care perspective on 
empirical studies, Annette Baier (1987) argues that the care perspective is compatible 
with the moral theory of David Hume. In other words Baier argues that Hume’s focus on 
sentiment rather than reason is consistent with Gilligan’s findings regarding the moral 
deliberations of women. Baier also argues that according to Hume the development of 
character traits which deal with the relations to others are the most important virtues. 
Therefore, she argues Humean moral theory is compatible with the care perspective. 
Feminist philosophers argue that Gilligan’s work with the care perspective opens up a 
dialogue which provides a way to eliminate what they perceive as a male bias in western 
moral theory.  
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 It is important to note that while Gilligan’s work has opened a new dialogue 
concerning the role of women’s perspective in moral decision-making, it is not the case 
that all feminists are in agreement concerning what constitutes a feminist ethic.  
Notwithstanding feminist disagreements, Alison Jaggar (2000) suggests three minimal 
criteria which must be met for any ethical theory to be considered a feminist theory. 
Jaggar’s Criteria 
 Jaggar (2000) argues that for an ethical theory to be considered a feminist ethical 
theory it must meet three minimum criteria. First, it must be active, engaged, and 
political. Second, it must be on the side of the oppressed and it must address the private 
as well as the public domain. Finally, an adequate feminist theory must take the moral 
experience of all women seriously. Note that Jaggar is not suggesting that the experience 
be accepted without critical evaluation. According to Jaggar, only ethical theories which 
meet these minimum criteria can be considered an adequate feminist theory (1989, 
pp.192-194). Raugust’s essay nicely illustrates Jaggar’s points as she applies them to her 
practical experience with the Kennedy Aging Project. 
The Kennedy Aging Project 
 Raugust (2000) recounts her experience as the feminist director of the Kennedy 
Aging Project. She argues that in recent years many well-educated and talented women 
have left their jobs to pursue other careers because they find the values of the patriarchal 
workplace inconsistent with their own values. Raugust argues that there is a male bias in 
the western ethical tradition which often alienates female workers. 
The purpose of the Kennedy Aging Project was to teach healthcare professionals 
how to deliver care to dual diagnosis individuals, that is, to individuals who are both 
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elderly and mentally challenged. In her capacity as director, Raugust placed the primary 
focus on providing service to her clients. However, the workplace ethic that evolved not 
only fit Jaggar’s criteria for a feminist ethic it also illustrated the major principles of the 
care perspective. Unlike my project, Raugust did not set out to create a care perspective 
for a long term healthcare facility; rather she describes the work environment that 
evolved at the Kennedy Aging Project under her direction and with a staff that shared a 
similar political philosophy (2000, p.196). 
After three years, Raugust argues that six ethical tenets evolved which exemplify 
feminist ethics and the ethics of care. First, relationships instead of individual rights 
became the priority of ethical enactment. Second, the focus was on giving and receiving  
care rather than the exercise of individual autonomy. Third, interdependence rather than 
individualism resulted in a leveling of status among the staff. That is to say all staff were 
responsible for direct care and one’s position as an administrator did not exclude him/her 
form providing direct care to a resident.  
Fourth, others were seen as particular others rather than the impersonal other of 
the justice perspective. Fifth, rather than the employment of abstract reasoning, decisions 
were contextualized and based on particular residents. Finally, virtue rather than justice 
was seen as the highest good. Raugust argues that the workplace ethic that evolved at the 
Kennedy project was an embodiment of feminist ethics and as such further supports the 
claim that women make moral decisions from a different perspective than their male 
counterparts (2000, pp.196-199).   
Clearly, there are relevant disanalogous characteristics between my project and 
Raugust’s project. However, they are also analogous on many relevant characteristics.  
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Given that feminist ethics is largely put forth as an alternative to Kantian ethics, I must 
undertake a critical evaluation of the ethics of care in relation to my project of addressing 
the moral evil of objectification of nursing home residents.  
 Before I do that I will briefly mention some general criticisms of the ethics of 
care. There are several criticisms that can be leveled at the ethics of care in general. First, 
it is descriptive rather than prescriptive. In other words it is premised on the naturalistic 
fallacy that it is acceptable to go from “it is the case” to “it ought to be the case.” Of 
course this also applies to Raugust’s work. Feminist such as Hilde Lindeman (2004) have 
countered this criticism by suggesting that there are normative aspects of feminist theory 
and that it is not necessarily descriptive. Others challenge the legitimacy of the 
naturalistic fallacy itself.  
Another criticism that may be leveled at the ethics of care in general is that it is 
engendered relativism. In other words, care ethics appears to be making the claim that 
morality and moral decision-making is relative to one’s gender. Finally, the question can 
be posed as to whether or not the care perspective approach to ethical decision making is 
the consequence of gender or socialization. However, the critical discussion of these 
issues is beyond the scope of my project.  In relation to feminist ethics in general and the 
ethics of care specifically, my only concern is whether it provides an adequate ethical 
theory. That is, one that maintains the subjectivity of the nursing home resident while 
simultaneously avoiding objectification. 
 It is my position that the ethics of care is inadequate in terms of my project 
because of the following three reasons. First, it promotes a paternalistic or perhaps more 
accurately a maternalistic attitude toward the resident/ nurse relationship which creates 
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the potential for the nursing home resident to be seen as an object of care, that is, 
dependent and child like. Second, there is the false assumption that face-to-face relations 
result in a caring relationship. And finally, the lack of concern for residents’ rights and 
the shift away from justice as the highest moral value to virtue tends to undermine human 
dignity because the quality of care provided is contingent on the caregiver.  
Priestly Model 
 In Robert Veatch’s classic expose of the possible models of patient/physician 
relationships he introduces four possible models of physician-patient relationships: the 
priestly model, the engineering model, the collegial model, and the contractual 
model.  He describes the priestly model as the traditional paternalistic relationship 
between the patient and his/her physician in which the primary decision maker is the 
physician (1986, pp.56-59). If we apply Veatch’s models to the relationship between the 
nurse and resident in the Kennedy Aging Project, I maintain that the priestly model is the 
most accurate description of that relationship.  The acknowledged flaw in this model is 
that the patient has very little input regarding their healthcare decisions. The issue of 
patient’s rights is absent from the priestly model just as the focus on individual rights 
was replaced by a focus on care in the Raugust project. This is problematic for my project 
because it creates a situation in which care is viewed as the primary good and not  
patients’ rights. It therefore creates a potential for cruel and unusual treatment and 
possible lying to the resident justified on the basis of providing care. 
 The nurse as caregiver believes that providing care is in the best interest of the 
resident and not upholding their individual right to refuse treatment. Therefore, it is a 
common occurrence for medications to be administered in apple sauce or pudding 
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without acknowledging the presence of that medication to the resident.  Further, a 3AM 
whirlpool bath becomes acceptable because one is providing care. I maintain that in 
situations such as the ones described above, it is the caregiver who becomes the judge of 
what constitutes care and not the resident. This occurs because the focus in the ethics of 
care views caring as a good. Therefore, the failure of the ethics of care to acknowledge 
the language of rights creates a potential for the nursing home resident to become an 
object of care rather than a person with dignity and intrinsic value. 
Face-to Face Relationships 
Another problem as I see it with the ethics of care is that it assumes that face-to-
face relationships result in the establishment of caring relationships. After having worked 
as a healthcare Aid for 4 1/2 years this seems to me to be another example of a Leave It 
To Beaver view of the world and human relationships. An experience I had with a man I 
will call Mr. G illustrates the point that not all face-to-face relationships result in caring. 
Mr. G by all accounts was a mean-spirited individual. He was abusive to his family and 
the staff. For example he had over the years physically and verbally abused his wife and 
daughter. Therefore, they rarely came to visit him. In terms of his treatment of staff, he 
threw urinals full of urine at aids, and verbally abused a number of staff members with 
degrading and often racist slurs, and had at times physically struck an aid.  This face-to-
face relationship resulted not in any empathy or sentiment toward Mr. G. but in fact in 
extreme dislike and an unwillingness by the staff to provide care for Mr. G. 
Unfortunately I was assigned Mr. G. and I will admit I loathed the man, but I also 
believed that I had a moral obligation to treat him with respect and provide the necessary 
care. I remember telling Mr. G. “I do not like you and you do not like me, but I will treat 
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you with respect and you will treat me with respect.” I took care of Mr. G. for several 
years and although he came to like me as a person I was never able to overcome my 
loathing of him. While I was able to provide him with an acceptable level of nursing care, 
I never did care for him. The point of this example is to illustrate to the reader that not all 
face-to-face relationships result in a caring relationship or any sort of sentiment. Further, 
I would argue that in such cases the ethics of care is inadequate because it assumes an 
empathy or sentiment results from face-to-face relations. In other words, under the ethics 
of care it would appear that Mr. G’s quality of healthcare care is contingent on the 
individual staff member’s relationship with him.  In instances when that relationship does 
not result in caring on the part of the staff his healthcare would suffer if the staff member 
did not make her decisions regarding his care based on another ethical perspective. In 
light of that consideration, I maintain that, in instances like the one I encountered with 
Mr. G., the impersonal justice perspective provides a more adequate framework for 
providing care based on a moral obligation of justice. Thus a shift in focus from rights to 
providing care undermines human dignity and by implication one’s self-esteem. Joel 
Feinberg addresses the relationship between rights and human dignity. 
Nowheresville 
    In his thought experiment concerning the value of rights, Feinberg (1970) 
introduces the reader to a place called Nowheresville. In Nowheresville there is 
benevolence, sympathy, and compassion. The people are virtuous. Kindness and 
compassion are the norm.  Nowheresville is by all accounts a very pleasant place where 
people help one and other are charitable, kind, and compassionate. By analogy, 
Nowheresville is similar to the Kennedy Aging Project. What is missing in Feinberg’s 
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Nowheresville is the concept of rights. Nowheresvilleans do not have rights. The rewards 
given to the residents of Nowheresville are contingent on the benevolence of others. As 
Feinberg points out Nowheresville would have little appeal for Kant. I would like to 
remind the reader that in Raugust’s Kennedy Aging Project the primacy of the notion of 
rights has been replaced by the primacy of the notion of care.  The issue Feinberg raises 
in regards to the notion of rights is  whether or not the absence of a notion of rights is 
morally significant?  Feinberg (1970) argues in regard to the moral significance of rights : 
They are especially sturdy objects to “stand upon,” a most useful sort of 
moral furniture. Having rights, of course, makes claiming possible: but it 
is claiming that gives rights their special moral significance. This feature 
of rights is connected in a way with the customary rhetoric about what it is 
like to be a human being. Having rights enables us to “stand up like men,” 
to look others in the eye, and to feel in some fundamental way the equal of 
anyone. To think of oneself as the holder of rights is not to be unduly but 
properly proud, to have that minimal self-respect that is necessary to be 
worthy of the love and esteem of others. Indeed, respect for persons (that 
is an intriguing idea) may be respect for their rights, so that there cannot 
be the one without the other: and what is called “human dignity” may be 
simply the recognizable capacity to assert claims. To respect a person 
then, or to think of him as possessed of human dignity, simply is to think 
of him as a potential maker of claims (pp. 69-70). 
 As Feinberg points out human dignity and respect for persons is tied to the 
language of rights and claiming. I agree with Feinberg that rights are a kind of moral 
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furniture that allows one to assert their intrinsic value. The notion of rights enables me to 
claim that “By the nature of my personhood I have equal moral value. I am a subject not 
an object.” In contrast, the lack of a notion of rights makes my moral value contingent on 
conditions external to myself. That is I am not valuable in and of myself but only if some 
one else values me. For example, in feminist writings that deny the abortion debate 
should be grounded in the language of rights and the question of personhood, the moral 
status of the fetus is contingent on the fetus’ relationship to the mother. In other words, 
the fetus has moral value only if the mother chooses to carry the fetus to term. The fetus 
has moral value because of her relationship to her mother. That value is extrinsic not 
intrinsic. There is no discussion of fetal rights versus the rights of the mother. The sole 
determining factor of the fetus’ moral value is the relationship the mother chooses.     
   Independent of any judgment of the morality of abortion and without addressing 
 the numerous ethical issues which surround the abortion debate, i.e. personhood, the 
right to privacy,  I contend that the ethics of care, which disregards the language of rights, 
runs the risk of undermining human dignity and therefore creates a potential for 
objectification. I argue that it is precisely the turning away from the notion of rights to 
embrace the ethics of care that results in the inadequacy of the care perspective to address 
the goal of my project, which is to provide a safety net for maintaining personhood while 
one is confined in a nursing home.  
Further, although the result is the same there is a morally significant distinction 
between claiming a right to something and receiving something as an act of benevolence 
or charity on the part of another.  The moral significance between the dignity associated 
with claiming a right to something and receiving something as an act of benevolence or 
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charity is perhaps better understood if we consider the difference between welfare and 
social security. There are literally thousands of Americans who qualify for welfare and 
Medicaid. However, many of those individuals never apply for welfare because they feel 
it is demeaning and an affront to their pride to accept charity. On the other hand, few 
individuals fail to claim their social security and Medicare because they feel they have a 
legitimate claim to what is owed them. It is their right in a way that welfare is not. In the 
case of Mr. G. the notion of rights enables him to claim his right to care independent of 
any relationship he establishes with his care givers simply because it is his right. 
 These considerations support the end formulation of the Kantian categorical 
imperative, with its focus on respect for persons, as a more adequate solution to the moral 
problem of objectification in the nursing home setting than does the ethics of care. 
Because the ethics of care is grounded in relationships, it is not able to prevent the 
objectification that can result when an individual is viewed as an object to be cared for 
rather than as a person who has the right to accept or refuse care. 
 I would like to point out to the reader that I am in no way disregarding the 
contribution of feminist ethics to the western tradition nor am I arguing that it is not a 
legitimate ethical approach. I am merely suggesting that in terms of my project of 
avoiding objectification in the nursing home setting, the end formulation of the Kantian 
categorical imperative provides a more tenable ethical framework. Further, that is not to 
say that I am suggesting that the two ethical theories are mutually exclusive. On the 
contrary I contend that they should inform one another. In other words, justice should be 
tempered with compassion, persons require faces, women’s moral experience must be 
considered, and oppression based on gender must be opposed.      
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 Finally, my goal in the following chapter is to address the criticism that Kantian 
ethical theory is purely formal and lacks content. My intent is to unpack the end 
formulation of the categorical imperative in order to demonstrate that it does in fact have 
content. Furthermore, that content is applicable to developing guidelines for establishing 
a Kantian nursing home that provides care, and is also invaluable in providing guidelines 
which create an environment that is not conducive to the moral evil of objectification.   
  
      
Chapter Three 
Unpacking the End Formulation of the Categorical Imperative 
Introduction 
 In this chapter I will develop Propositions Four and Five. First, I argue that we 
have an indirect duty to treat non-rational humans “as if they are persons.” This argument 
is based on an analogy with Kant’s argument regarding our treatment of animals. It is 
important to the development of my overall thesis because it demonstrates that the end 
formulation of the categorical imperative has implications for nursing home residents 
who lack rationality.  In developing Proposition Five, I argue for two positions. First, the 
end formulation of the categorical imperative prohibits coercing, lying or manipulation of 
nursing home residents. Second, it imposes a duty upon a nursing home to avert obstacles 
to autonomy. I contend that combined these two positions suggest guidelines for 
developing a just nursing home. 
 In the Ground Work of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785/1964), Kant instructs us 
that we have duties both to ourselves and others: 
 Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own 
 person or the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always 
 at the same time as an end (p.96). 
This formulation of the categorical imperative referred to by Kant as the Formula of the 
End in Itself (End Formulation) argues that we should never treat ourselves and others as 
merely a means and we should respect ourselves and others as an end. This is the case for 
Kant because personhood is defined in terms of rationality. 
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 A person, in Kantian terms, is a rational, autonomous, moral agent.  Rational beings have 
absolute intrinsic value. They are capable of establishing objective goals and choosing 
appropriate means to achieve those goals.  Their actions are not determined by instinct.  
Therefore, they are an end in itself and provide the basis of determinate law. In other 
words, persons are lawgivers. Rationality and the ability to develop objective ends that 
apply universally to all rational beings provides the basis for Kantian ethical theory and 
the Supreme Principle of morality the Categorical Imperative. 
  In light of the Kantian criteria for personhood, some readers may challenge my 
application of the end formulation of the categorical imperative as the basis for 
development of a just nursing home. Such a challenge undoubtedly will arise from the 
fact that not all nursing home residents are rational. Therefore, some nursing home 
residents are not part of the Kantian moral community, i.e. non-persons.  
 Clearly, that is the case. In any nursing home there is a continuum of rationality 
which spans both ends of the spectrum from the rational to the PVS patient (persistent 
vegetative state) who lacks all capacity for consciousness and therefore rationality. It is 
my intention to take this challenge by the horns and address it head on without any 
waffling on my part. I will undertake the issue of non-rational human beings before 
proceeding to unpack the duties imposed upon us by the end formulation of the 
categorical imperative.  
Kantian Ethics and Animals 
 Based on an analogy with Kant’s argument regarding our indirect duty not to act 
cruelly toward animals, I contend that we do in fact have an indirect moral duty to treat 
non-rational human beings “as if they were persons.” Simply stated my argument is that: 
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If we treat non-rational human beings as “mere means” it will harm our own humanity in 
the same way that cruelty to animals harms our own humanity. Therefore, we have an 
indirect duty to treat all human beings “as if they are persons.” 
  Although Kant obviously did not address the question of PVS patients, he did 
address the issue of our duties to animals in his Lectures on Ethics (1770’s/1963). Before 
addressing Kant’s position on animals, I would like to make a few comments about the 
Lectures. Although the Lectures were not written by Kant, but rather transcribed either by 
or for three of his students, they provide a valuable insight into Kant the beloved 
professor and his passion for ethics. As Lewis Beck (1963) points out, the Lectures allow 
us to see Kant the eloquent speaker who often brought his audience to tears. Beck also 
argues, and I agree, that without reading the Lectures and the Metaphysics of Morals and 
seriously considering Kant’s handling of the other components of a good person, one may 
erroneously hold that for Kant a moral person is reducible to an emotionless “thinking 
machine,” a robot (pp xii-xiii).   
In the Lectures Kant argues that while we have no direct duties to animals, we do 
have indirect duties to ourselves to refrain from cruelty to animals. These indirect duties 
are grounded in our duty to our own humanity. In other words because animals are not, 
from Kant’s perspective, rational we have no direct duties toward them. However, we do 
have an indirect duty to refrain from cruelty to animals because cruelty to animals 
damages our own humanity: 
 If a man shoots his dog because the animal is no longer 
 capable of service, he does not fail in his duty to the dog, 
 for the dog cannot judge, but his act is inhuman and damages 
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 in himself that humanity which it is his duty to show towards 
 mankind. If he is not to stifle his human feelings, he must practice 
 kindness towards animals, for he who is cruel to animals becomes 
 hard in his dealings with men. We can judge the heart of a man by his 
 treatment of animals (p. 240). 
In other words, for Kant we have a duty to preserve our own human feelings and 
therefore an indirect duty to refrain from cruelty to animals. This is the case because Kant 
believes that in many instances animal behavior is analogous to human behavior and 
cruelty to animals diminishes our empathy for their suffering and likewise our empathy 
for humans which is necessary in our relationships with other human beings. Kant 
addresses this issue again in the Metaphysics of Morals (1797/1996): 
 With regard to the animate but nonrational part of creation, violent and 
 cruel treatment of animals is far more intimately opposed to a human being’s 
 duty to himself, and he has a duty to refrain from this; for it dulls his shared 
 feelings of their suffering and so weakens and gradually uproots a natural 
 predisposition that is very serviceable to morality in one’s relations with 
 other men (pp.192-193).  
It appears that Kant is suggesting that a compassionate predisposition toward fellow 
humans aids an individual in her moral duty.   It is important to remember that for Kant 
(1770’s/1963) duties to ones’ self take precedence over our duty to others: 
  A man who performed his duty to others badly, who lacked generosity, 
 kindness, and sympathy, but who nevertheless did his duty to himself 
 by leading a proper life, might yet possess a certain inner worth; but 
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 he who has transgressed his duty towards himself, can have no inner worth 
 whatever (p118). 
Therefore to engage in actions and activities which degrade one’s own humanity is for 
Kant a serious moral offense.  For example, we have a Perfect Duty not to kill ourselves.   
Two questions may be raised in relation to Kant’s position. First, is it a valid 
claim?  Second, does the claim apply equally well to non-rational human beings? My 
answer is affirmative in both instances. First, let us investigate the empirical support for 
his claim that cruelty to animals leads to cruelty to humans. 
 It is interesting to note that there is significant empirical evidence which supports 
Kant’s claim that cruelty to animals leads to cruelty to humans. For example, various 
humane societies have conducted research and published statistics on the link between 
animal and human abuse (American Humane Society, Humane Society of the United 
States, Doris Day Animal League etc.). Research on serial killers suggests that one shared 
commonality among them is a history of cruelty to animals.  The infamous serial killers 
Jeffrey Dahmer, Albert DeSalvo, and David Berkowitz all had a history of animal abuse 
(Briggs, 1994, pp24-28).  
 In addition, in the Columbine case it is known that both Harris and Klebol 
abused animals before turning their guns on their classmates (psyeta.org).   Some states 
consider the evidence of the correlation between animal abuse and human abuse strong 
enough to warrant instructions to humane agents investigating alleged animal abuse, to 
check on children and seniors who reside at the address under investigation. 
The investigation of the relationship between animal and human abuse is a multi-
disciplinary field. The field includes such diverse authors as feminist Cindy Adams 
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(1995) and her paper on the relationship between battering women and animal abuse to 
FBI profilers on serial killers. Available contemporary research supports Kant’s 18th 
century claim that animal cruelty leads to human cruelty. Kant believed that this is the 
case because animal nature is analogous to human nature and cultivating kindness to 
animals enables us to cultivate kindness to humanity while cruelty to animals results in 
cruelty to humans. In the Lectures, Kant refers to Hogarth’s engravings entitled Stages of 
Cruelty in which he sequentially depicts a child pinching a dog’s tail, a man running over 
a child with a cart, and the final cruelty of murder.  
  Another point of interest brought up by Kant in the lectures on animals suggests 
that in England during that time period butchers and doctors were banned from juries 
because it was believed that their professions hardened them to death. I find this point 
significant because Kant is suggesting that certain professions by their very nature can 
harden individuals.  In relation to the nursing profession, it is often the case that nurses 
become de-sensitized to the suffering of their patients.  My goal is to create in theory a 
just nursing home environment in which that desensitization does not occur. 
Kant further suggests that the development of tender feelings toward animals 
results in the development of tender feelings toward humankind and visa versa. 
Therefore, although animals are not part of the Kantian moral community our duties to 
ourselves result in an indirect duty to refrain from engaging in cruelty to animals. 
Kantian Ethics and Non-rational Humans 
The question which I wish to pose is whether by analogy we can legitimately 
extend the Kantian argument against cruelty to animals to include not treating non-
rational humans such as PVS patients and other cognitively impaired nursing home 
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residents as “mere means”? My position is that an extension of Kant’s argument is not 
only legitimate, but that it holds true to an even greater degree in the case of non-rational 
humans because there is always the possibility of personhood.  In other words, treating 
non-rational humans as “mere means” degrades one’s own humanity and hinders the 
development of tender feelings toward humankind.    
Because my position makes a claim of fact about human nature, its legitimacy is 
contingent on empirical substantiation. The 20th century eugenics programs of the United 
States and Germany provide support for my position. Philip Reilly’s (1999) history of 
eugenic sterilization in the United States chronicles the United States’ eugenic program.  
The 1880 census report alarmed many people because it reported that “whereas the 
general population had grown by 30%, the apparent increase in “idiocy” was 200% 
(1999, p.517). The creation of asylums for defective women in their reproductive years 
was one of the first responses to this report. Although never legally implemented, several 
state legislatures debated proposals for mass castration of criminals. Ultimately the 
United States’ eugenics policy resulted in mandatory forced sterilization of the insane, 
criminals, and the feebleminded. The Eugenics Record Office was funded by some of 
America’s wealthiest families (Harriman, Kellogg, and Rockefeller). It is estimated that 
between 1907 and 1963 more than 60,000 persons were sterilized (Reilly, 1999).  
Perhaps the cruelest irony of the United States’ eugenics policy of forced sterilization is 
that the legal case Buck v. Bell (1927) which upheld Virginia’s mandatory sterilization 
laws by a vote of 8-1 was founded on a falsehood (Gould, 1999, p. 528-532).  In handing 
down the majority decision, Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote: 
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We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call 
upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not  
call upon those who already sap the strength of the state for these lesser 
sacrifices….It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute 
degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them  starve for their imbecility, 
society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their 
kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough 
to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. Three generations of imbeciles are 
enough (1999, p529).  
Justice Holmes is of course referring to Carrie Buck, her mother Emma, and her daughter 
Vivian. A re-examination of the case in 1980 revealed what many had suspected, neither 
Carrie Buck or her daughter were imbeciles, but rather both had normal intelligence. 
How did a man who was viewed as a champion of the Bill of Rights come to hold such a 
position and completely ignore the rights of Carrie Buck? Could it be the case that it was 
his belief that those who are mentally challenged are defective persons and therefore can 
justly be treated as a means to further the goals of society? Did that belief harden him to 
the rights of Carrie Buck and degrade his own humanity?  This case illustrates the danger 
of labeling some people as defective persons and then assuming that they may be treated 
as objects. It also, I believe, demonstrates an error in reasoning among those who hold 
that designation of personhood is a privileged category. In fact personhood in Kantian 
terms imposes duties on persons to act in a specific manner. Persons are not privileged in 
the sense that they may treat non-persons in any manner that they choose. On the contrary 
rationality and the ability to act independent of instinct imposes duties upon persons that 
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cannot be meaningfully imposed on non-persons. For example, we cannot meaningfully 
say of a group of beached whales that they have a moral duty not to commit suicide. 
However, we can say that persons have such a moral duty. In other words, personhood is 
not the assignment of privilege, but rather the assignment of responsibility. 
  The case of Carrie Buck, from my perspective, illustrates a misinterpretation of 
personhood and the duties it implies.  The German eugenics program is a further 
illustration of erroneously viewing personhood as a privileged position.  
In 1923 Fritz Lenz, a German geneticist and advocate of mandatory sterilization 
praised the United States’ eugenics sterilization policies. Under the banner of “life 
unworthy of life,” the Nazis began the forced sterilization of the feebleminded, insane, 
epileptic, blind, and deaf. Their preliminary estimates called for the initial mandatory 
sterilization of 410,000 persons (Liffton, 1999). Ultimately, the German eugenics 
program led to the final solution and the extermination of millions of people. In 
addressing the final solution, Heinrich Himmler (2004) in a speech to his SS subordinates 
in 1943 suggested the following: 
 …in sum, we can say that we fulfilled the heaviest of tasks [destroy- 
 ing the Jews] in love to our people. And we suffered no harm in our 
 essence, in our soul, in our character (p.97). 
 It is of course the actions of the Nazis which resulted in the term crimes against 
humanity. Can it be the case as Himmler claims that the Nazis did not degrade their own 
humanity?  On the contrary,   I would argue that Himmler’s speech is a self-contradiction 
in the sense that his lack of remorse or moral repugnance at the extermination of the Jews 
reflects his lack of conscience.  Himmler and the Nazis serve as evidence that cruelty to 
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non-rational human beings degrades one’s own humanity and hardens one so that he or 
she no longer has as Kant argued a natural predisposition to have tender feelings toward 
humanity.  I would like to remind the reader that the Nazis’ final solution began with 
Hitler’s “useless eater policy.”   The policy of first sterilizing than gassing the mentally ill 
and mentally challenged ultimately led to the extermination of millions of people.  
In light of the above, my point is that just as it is the case with animal cruelty 
treating non-rational humans as “mere means” leads to cruelty to humankind.   Therefore, 
based on the end formulation of the categorical imperative we have an indirect duty to 
refrain from treating non-rational human beings as “mere means” just as we do to refrain 
from cruelty to animals.  
The Case of Dana 
I believe that the cases of a young woman who I will call Dana and an elderly 
woman who I will call Ada provides the reader with a better understanding of why it is 
the case that treating non-rational humans with the respect due persons benefits one’s 
own humanity. First I will discuss the case of Dana. Dana and her boyfriend were coming 
home from the senior prom when they were run off the road and hit a tree head on. Dana 
suffered closed head trauma and never regained consciousness. I did not become 
acquainted with her until several years later. At that time I was working as a certified 
nursing assistant and she was assigned to my care. Dana had a tracheotomy, but she was 
able to breathe on her own for short periods of time. Her mother visited her on a daily 
basis. In addition to her medical needs, her daily care consisted of bathing, dressing and 
being placed in a geriatric chair. Her mother often took her outside and she was provided 
with outside stimuli such as television and radio.  
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 I always talked to her and treated her as if she were conscious as I performed her 
care. In the nightstand beside her bed was a photograph of her with her dog. I still 
remember the dog. It was a little brown dog and he was wearing a red bandanna. Her 
mother told me how much she loved animals. It was the practice of this particular nursing 
home for staff and others who were not on duty to dress up their pets and bring them to 
the nursing home on Halloween. I brought my black lab Shane dressed as a cowboy. My 
main reason for doing so was to introduce him to Dana.  Shane was a very affectionate 
and kind dog. When I took him in Dana’s room he jumped on the bed and licked her face. 
She smiled and of that I am sure.  Whether or not her smile was an involuntary response 
to Shane’s lick or an expression of pleasure I will never know. However, what I do know 
is how her smile affected me. In Kant’s terms I had tender feelings toward Dana. I 
believe as Kant did that the development of tender feelings towards in this case 
defenseless others develop in us “humane feelings toward mankind” that aids us in 
fulfilling our moral duties. Our duties towards non-rational humans, then, “are indirect 
duties towards mankind.”  Therefore, we have a duty to treat the non-rational nursing 
home resident “as if he or she is a person.”  To treat Dana as the vegetable in room 2 may 
or may not harm Dana, but it does harden the nursing staff and degrade their humanity. In 
addition to the example provided by  Dana’s case, the case of Ada further demonstrates 
the inherent danger of treating human beings as objects. 
The Case of Ada 
 I intentionally left my experience with Ada out of the first draft of this chapter 
because it forces me to admit that despite my efforts to the contrary I am guilty of 
treating a human being as an object.  Ada suffered from Parkinson disease and numerous 
 50
other ailments. She was contracted and stiff from the neck down. She was fed through a 
feeding tube. Basically, she lay in the bed twenty four hours a day seven days a week. 
The nursing assistant’s care of Ada amounted to turning and repositioning her, changing 
her bed and giving her a whirlpool bath. We often spoke about Ada’s condition while 
providing her with care. I remember saying “I would rather be dead then lying there like 
that.” I assumed as did the other aids that Ada was not aware of our conversation. 
However, one day I turned off her television and Ada said “leave it on.” I ran to the 
nurses’ station to report that Ada could speak. I was told that they were aware that Ada 
could speak. I realized that Ada had heard my comments. I ran back to apologize to her 
and she told me it was okay. However from my perspective, it was not okay. I am still 
bothered by my lack of concern for Ada’s feelings. I believe that my experience with Ada 
reveals how easy it is to treat a human being as an object when one assumes that they are 
a non-person for whatever reason.  
 My suggestion that our humanity is harmed when we treat human beings as “mere 
means” is not without support in American culture. For example, our elaborate funeral 
practices. The deceased is clearly a thing, but we show it respect. I argue that is the case 
because callous treatment of the dead is harmful to our own humanity.  
 In the case of biomedical ethics, Americans take great care to protect the interests 
of the non-rational individual. The case of Terri Schiavo illustrates this fact. Although 
they disagreed, both parties (husband and family) appeared to be concerned with Terri’s 
best interests. The question is why when the woman had been in a PVS state for years 
was there so much public concern over the removal of her feeding tube.  I maintain that 
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the reason is our treatment of the Terri Schiavos of the world is a reflection on our own 
humanity.  
 A reading of the bioethics literature on euthanasia illustrates a strong desire on the 
part of humankind to distance ourselves from the Heinrich Himmler’s of the world.  The 
Helsinki Code with its focus on the need for proxy consent for the incompetent stands as 
a testimony to the belief that the way we treat non-rational humans is a reflection of our 
own humanity.    
  I have, I believe, clearly stated my position in regards to non-rational human 
beings: We have an indirect duty, based on Kantian ethics, to treat them “as if they are 
persons.”  To treat them as persons means within the context of this work to uphold the 
duties imposed by the end formulation of the categorical imperative. I will address the 
specific application of this position within the context of the nursing home in the final 
chapter.  I now wish to address the duties imposed upon us by the end formulation of the 
categorical imperative.   
The Formulation of the End in Itself 
Prior to unpacking the end formulation of the categorical imperative, I believe it is 
helpful to comment on several key features of Kantian ethics. First, Kantian ethics is an 
ethics of duty, not as some suggest an ethics of rights. Normally rights theorists argue, 
based on the correlativity thesis, that rights imply duties. However, not all Kantian duties 
have corresponding rights. For example there is a Kantian duty of benevolence, but there 
is not a corresponding right to benevolence.  
 Second the focus of Kantian ethics is on motivation not consequences. Kantian 
ethics is concerned with the maxims we act upon. Maxims are the underlying principles 
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upon which we act. Therefore when the categorical imperative instructs us that we should 
“act on only that maxim which we can at the same time will to be universal law,” Kant is 
telling us that the principles upon which we act have to be universally applicable to all 
persons in morally similar circumstances.    
 Finally, although Kantian ethics usually focuses on the actions of individuals, its 
scope can be extended to institutions or organizations in which there is a decision making 
body. In the present case the governing body of the nursing home or legislatures who 
enact legislation that establishes the guidelines for operating a nursing home. 
 Kant develops the end formulation of the categorical imperative in the 
Groundwork at 64-69. In regards to the end formulation, Kant tells us we have a duty not 
to treat humanity either in ourselves or in others as a “mere means”. It is important to 
note that Kant is saying a “mere means” because of course we all use one another as a 
means in some way or another. In the case of the healthcare worker the resident is a 
means of obtaining a paycheck.  The nurse is a means of receiving care for the nursing 
home resident. What Kant means by treating a person as a “mere means” is that through 
coercion, deception or manipulation a person consents to an arrangement that she would 
not otherwise consent to. Kant provides two illustrations of using one’s self or another as 
a mere means (66-69). These are the Perfect Duties. His first illustration is suicide. Kant 
argues that if one commits suicide to remove herself from a painful situation she is using 
herself as a mere means. Therefore, persons have a Perfect Duty not to kill themselves. 
 Kant’s second illustration is of the individual who makes a false promise. Kant 
argues that the person who makes the false promise is using the other person as a mere 
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means: he intends “to make use of another man merely as a means to an end he does not 
share” (68). Therefore, we have Perfect Duty not to lie. 
 Although there are numerous examples in medical research of using persons as 
“mere means,” perhaps the most glaring example in the history of American medical 
research of using persons as “mere means” is the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment. In this 
case the research subjects were coerced, manipulated, and deceived into agreeing to 
participate in the Tuskegee experiment. This manipulation was possible because the 
participants, due to their extreme poverty and race, were a vulnerable population. The 
researchers clearly treated the study subjects as “mere means” (objects). From a Kantian 
perspective, the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment can be judged to be highly immoral. 
 In addition to the moral prohibition against using persons as  “mere means,” Kant 
argues that we have a duty to treat persons as “ends in themselves.” For Kant this means 
that we must treat persons as rational autonomous beings.  As Onora O’Neill (1993) 
points out: 
In doing so we must remember that (as Kant repeatedly stressed, but later 
Kantians have often forgotten) human beings are finite rational beings in several 
ways. First, human beings are not ideal rational calculators. We standardly have 
neither a complete list of the actions possible in a given situation nor more than a 
partial view of their likely consequences. In addition, abilities to assess and to use 
available information are usually quite limited. Second, these cognitive 
limitations are standardly complemented by limited autonomy. Human action is 
limited not only by various sorts of physical barrier and inability but by further 
sorts of (mutual or asymmetrical) dependence. To treat one another as ends in 
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themselves such beings have to base their action on principles that do not 
undermine but rather sustain and extend one another’s capacities for autonomous 
actions. A central requirement for doing so is to share and support one another’s 
ends and activities to some extent. Since finite rational beings cannot generally 
achieve their aims without some help and support from others, a general refusal of 
help and support amounts to failure to treat others as rational autonomous beings, 
that is, as ends in themselves (p.262). 
O’Neill suggests that Kantians are required to do what they can to remove obstacles that 
limit the possibility of autonomous action. In her case she is addressing world hunger and 
the duty of Kantians to do what they can to reduce hunger.  
In other words the end formulation of the categorical imperative prohibits 
Kantians from using persons as a “mere means” and also requires Kantians to act in such 
a way that when possible they act to  remove obstacles that limit the possibility of 
autonomous action.  As O’Neill argues in regard to world hunger and poverty, “Kantians 
are required to do what they can to avert, reduce, and remedy hunger. They cannot of 
course do everything to avert hunger: but they may not do nothing” (1993, p.262).  
O’Neill’s position is consistent with and supported by Kant’s notion of beneficence as an 
Imperfect duty:  
This is, however, merely to agree negatively and not positively with 
 Humanity as an end in itself unless every one endeavors also, so far as 
 in him lies, to further the ends of others. For the ends of a subject who 
 is an end in himself must, if this conception is to have its full effect in me, 
  be also, as far as possible, my ends (69). 
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In other words we not only have a negative duty to refrain from treating persons as a 
“mere means” but a positive duty to do what we can to promote the possibility of 
autonomous action in other persons. Although the end formulation cannot provide us 
with specific policies, it does provide a method of judging the justness of policies. 
Policies that treat persons as “mere means” are unjust and those that promote the 
possibility of autonomous action are both just and required. In that sense there is content 
with determinate implications in the end formulation of the categorical imperative. 
 Obviously, Kantians are not required to further the ends of every person. 
However, in the case of the Kantian nursing home which I will call Kantian Meadows the 
special duties imposed as a consequence of the contract to provide care impose both a 
legal and moral duty on the directors as well as all the care givers to further the ends of 
all those individuals placed in their care. In light of the above, the next task is to identify 
barriers to the possibility of autonomous action.  
 O’Neill (1993) primary focus is on world hunger and poverty which she claims 
that Kantians must attempt to avert. Although they are not writing in relation to nursing 
home residents, Henry Shue and Anita Allen suggest other obstacles to the possibility of 
autonomous action that are particularly relevant to nursing home residents. 
Shue (1989) in addressing the justification of human rights suggests that basic rights are a 
necessary condition for the exercise of human rights (pp. 152-171). The reader may ask 
how the concept of human rights is related to the possibility of autonomous action. In 
discussing human rights there are three generations of human rights. The first generation 
rights are liberty rights. Clearly, liberty is a necessary condition of autonomous action. 
Therefore, if there are basic rights necessary for human rights, and liberty is not only a 
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first generation human right but also a necessary condition for the possibility of 
autonomous action, it follows that basic rights are necessary for the possibility of 
autonomous action. 
  Shue identifies subsistence and security as basic rights. Shue argues (1989): 
If any right is to be exercised except at great risk, physical security must be 
protected. In the absence of physical security people are unable to use any other 
rights that society may be said to be protecting without being liable to encounter 
many of the worst dangers they would encounter if society were not protecting 
 the rights (p. 158). 
That is, physical security is necessary in order for people to exercise any right. Shue 
further maintains that subsistence or minimal economic security, which he defines as 
“unpolluted air, unpolluted water, adequate food, adequate clothing, adequate shelter, and 
minimum preventive public health care,” is a necessary condition for the exercise of any 
right (1989, p. 159). 
 Shue’s position on the necessity of physical security and subsistence is consistent 
with O’Neill. In other words, the lack of physical security and subsistence are obstacles 
to the possibility of autonomous action because persons become vulnerable to 
manipulation. Anita Allen in her work suggests that privacy is a necessary condition of 
personhood. 
  Allen (1988) writing concerning the value of privacy for women in a free 
society, suggests that privacy in relation to personhood has both a person-creation and a 
person-enhancement value. Allen quotes Edward Bloustein to support her contention that 
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privacy has moral value. Bloustein’s (1979) observations are particularly relevant to the 
nursing home setting: 
 The man who is compelled to live every minute of his life 
 among others and whose every need, thought, desire, fancy or  
 gratification is subject to public scrutiny, has been deprived of 
his individuality and human dignity. Such an individual merges 
with the mass. His opinions, being public, tend never to be 
different ; his aspirations, being known, tend always to be 
conventionally accepted ones; his feelings, being openly 
exhibited, tend to lose their quality of unique personal 
warmth and to become the feelings of every man. Such a being 
although sentient, is fungible; he is not an individual (p.42). 
Therefore, it can be argued that the lack of privacy is also an obstacle to the possibility of 
autonomous action and as such Kantians have a duty to avert it. 
 Allen suggests because of the moral value of privacy that institutions “that 
promote individual privacy can be justified on the grounds that privacy is crucial to 
sustaining and enhancing personhood in the moral sense” (1988, p.46).  Individual 
privacy becomes something that Kantian Meadows has a duty to promote. 
 While the end formulation of the categorical imperative cannot provide us with 
specific policies or a way to rank policies, it does provide us with a method of judging the 
morality of proposed policies; we cannot adopt policies that treat persons as “mere 
means” and Kantian Meadows has a duty to avert obstacles to the possibility of 
autonomous action. Based on the above discussion it may be argued that a lack of 
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physical security, economic subsistence, and individual privacy constitute obstacles to the 
possibility of autonomous action. Therefore, the policies of Kantian Meadows must avert 
those obstacles. 
 Finally, in the following chapter I will construct Kantian Meadows based on the 
duties imposed on Kantians by the end formulation of the categorical imperative. I will 
leave it to the reader to decide the appeal or lack of appeal of Kantian Meadows after 
they have read the final chapter.  
 
Chapter Four 
Kantian Meadows: A Nursing Home Dedicated to the Ethical Treatment of the 
Elderly 
 
 
Mission Statement 
 It is the philosophy of Kantian Meadows that all residents deserve to be 
treated in an ethical manner. To ensure our commitment to the ethical treatment of 
our residents Kantian Meadows will enact only those policies and procedures that 
prohibit the treatment of residents as “mere means” and promote those policies that 
treat residents as “end in themselves.” 
Introduction 
 In this chapter I will develop Proposition Six. That is, I will develop, in theory, a 
nursing home whose policies and procedures are consistent with the end formulation of 
the categorical imperative. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that the end 
formulation of the categorical imperative does have a practical application in the 
development of a nursing home. Therefore, I will argue for guidelines, procedures, and 
practices that uphold the duties I argued that are imposed upon a nursing home in chapter 
three. 
 This project is undertaken in order to guarantee that the individuals who enter the 
doors of Kantian Meadows will not be subjected to the moral evil of objectification and 
that the environment of Kantian Meadows  will remain conducive to retention of a 
resident’s dignity and personhood. It should also be remembered that Kantian Meadows 
endorses the policy of treating non-rational human beings “as if they were persons.”  
Now let us imagine a place called Kantian Meadows. 
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Brief Description 
 Kantian Meadows, a 100 bed long term care facility, is located on 2 acres of land 
in Anywhere USA. Kantian Meadows has a twenty five bed secure Alzheimer unit 
complete with its own courtyard.  It is a non-profit facility. 
Opened in 2006, it is dedicated to the preservation of the dignity of all its residents. Its 
architectural style is circular with all resident rooms facing inward toward a central 
nursing station. Kantian Meadows has several professionally landscaped courtyards that 
are fenced for resident security. Therefore, in most ways Kantian Meadows resembles 
other American nursing homes. However, Kantian Meadows is distinct from other 
nursing homes in that the end formulation of the categorical imperative serves as the 
basis for judging the ethical or unethical nature of all institutional policies. In order to 
guarantee that the principles of the end formulation of the categorical imperative are 
upheld Kantian Meadows has in place an oversight committee. Let us, now take a more 
detailed look at the organizational structure of Kantian Meadows. 
Non-Profit Status 
 We at Kantian Meadows have chosen to become a non-profit facility because we 
are concerned about the potential for a conflicts of interest had we chosen a for-profit 
status. Although we are not of the opinion that there is necessarily an inherent injustice in 
capitalism, we do believe that a commitment to profit maximization is not in all cases 
consistent with the requirements of the categorical imperative. For example, a bottom line 
of profit maximization would only require that state and federal staffing minimum 
requirements are upheld. However, as will be explained later those requirements are not 
sufficient if Kantian Meadows is to guarantee that residents will not be treated as “mere 
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means” and treated as “ends in themselves.”  Therefore, in light of Kantian Meadows 
commitment to its philosophy, a non-profit status has been chosen. In furtherance of our 
philosophy we have also chosen a circular architectural design.  
Architectural Design 
 Although the categorical imperative does not support one architectural design 
over another, Kantian Meadows has chosen the circular design because within a circle 
everyone is equidistance from the center and as such we believe that the design promotes 
a sense of equality among our residents and visibility to the head nurse. On the other 
hand, the common choice of a linear design tends to create a sense of inequality. That is, 
commonly nursing homes and other institutions are constructed in such away that long 
linear hallways run off the central nursing station. Therefore, a hierarchical structure is 
created in which individuals may feel isolated from the group. Based on my own 
experience as a nursing assistant, it is often the case that the more demanding or 
troublesome residents are placed as far away from the nurses station as possible. Those 
residents who occupy the rooms at the end of the hall tend to be isolated from other 
residents and the activity which surrounds the nursing station. In this way there tends to 
be a structurally created inequality that the choice of a circular design mitigates. Based on 
this consideration, Kantian Meadows has purposely chosen a circular design in the hope 
of promoting a sense of equality among our residents. The individuals who occupy 
Kantian Meadows span the spectrum from those who are capable of autonomous action 
to those who lack any possibility of autonomous action. 
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Resident Demographics 
 There are only two restrictions that Kantian Meadows places on admittance.  First 
and foremost, we must have the ability to provide the potential resident with all necessary 
care. Therefore, because of the specialized nature of caring for respirator dependent 
residents, Kantian Meadows will not accept respirator dependent residents or those 
individuals suffering from spinal cord injuries that require specialized care.   
And of course, the second restriction is the availability of bed space on an 
appropriate housing unit. That is, we would not accept someone who is not suffering with 
Alzheimer disease and place him or her on an Alzheimer unit because there is an 
available bed.  We believe that this decision is consistent with the categorical imperative 
because to do otherwise, we believe, would amount to treating the individual as a “mere 
means;” a body to fill a bed. 
     In light of our admission criteria, the ability of autonomous action among   
residents of Kantian Meadows is greatly varied. There are those residents for whom 
autonomous action is possible because they suffer only from physical limitations that 
prohibit independent living. A significant number of our residents have limited 
autonomy. Others lack the possibility of autonomous action altogether because they 
remain in a persistent vegetative state. Finally, twenty-five percent of our residents suffer 
from of Alzheimer disease.  This results in varying possibilities for autonomous action. 
However, I would like to remind the reader once again, it has already been argued that 
Kantian Meadows will treat all human beings “as if they were persons.” In order to 
guarantee Kantian Meadows’ commitment to the categorical imperative is upheld, it is 
necessary to establish an oversight committee. 
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Configuration and Qualifications of Oversight Committee 
 The committee will consist of two Kantian bioethicists, two attorneys, two nurses, 
two physicians, a diversity of clergy, and two pharmacists.  The bioethicists will be 
experts both in the area of healthcare ethics and Kantian ethical theory. Their primary 
responsibility will be to ensure that the policies and procedures adopted by Kantian 
Meadows are consistent with the moral duties imposed by the categorical imperative. 
That is, they will ensure that no residents are treated as “mere means” and that Kantian 
Meadows as much as possible averts obstacles to the possibility of autonomy.  The case 
of Ada discussed in Chapter Three illustrates how easily, even for Kantians, it is to treat a 
person as a “mere means.” In addition, the policies and procedures of Kantian Meadows 
will avoid as much as possible any policies and practices that threaten the security, 
subsistence and privacy of our residents. This is the case because as discussed in Chapter 
Three the lack of security, subsistence, and privacy acts as an obstacle to the possibility 
of autonomous action. In light of Kantian Meadows commitment to the ethical treatment 
of all its residents, the bioethicists will retain the final veto power over any and all 
practices. The other consideration in relation to the legitimacy of policies and practices is 
of course the legal aspect. 
 The presence of two attorneys on the committee will ensure that those 
requirements are met. One attorney’s expertise will be in the area of non-profit rules and 
regulations. He or she will retain veto power over all issues relating to Kantian Meadows 
non-profit status. The other attorney will be an expert in the field of healthcare law. 
Therefore, he or she will be responsible for guaranteeing that all legal requirements are 
met and as such will retain veto power over all issues directly relating to healthcare law. 
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The purpose of the presence of clergy, physicians, and nurses on the over sight committee 
is to ensure that in what Kant called the empirical realm of the sensible, the subjective 
choices of non-rational residents are respected. That is, whereas the categorical 
imperative functions in the intelligible realm and goals are objective, personal choice 
functions in the empirical realm where goals are subjective. If the reader recalls 
Nussbaum’s notions of treating someone as an object, she will be reminded of notion 
number seven: Denial of Subjectivity. According to Nussbaum, this form of 
objectification occurs when we fail to take someone’s feelings and experience in account 
(1995, p.257).  It is this aspect of personhood that bioethics has largely ignored. Given its 
dedication to ensuring that its residents are not treated as “mere means,” Kantian 
Meadows cannot ignore the realm of subjective goals. The problem Kantian Meadows 
faces is how to decide those subjective questions in the cases in which individual 
residents are either not capable or limited in their ability to express their own subjective 
choices.  
Best Interest Standard 
 In terms of health care decisions, where the individual is capable of autonomous 
action the principle of voluntary informed consent will be maintained as the standard. 
Admittedly, voluntary informed consent is in some ways a flawed concept. However, it is 
the legal standard supported by the 1993 Patient Self Determination Act. Further, in the 
case of rational residents it appears to be the most justifiable standard of respecting 
resident autonomy. Autonomy within this context may be defined as allowing competent 
residents to exercise their liberty. However, Kantian Meadows is not only committed to 
respecting the autonomy of competent residents, it is also committed to respecting their 
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autonomy after they become incompetent.  Therefore, the “best interest” standard will be 
adopted in the case of incompetent residents. In consideration of the fact that what is in 
an individual’s best interest is not necessarily an objective medical determination, the 
input of family, physicians, nurses, and clergy is needed to determine what is  in the “best 
interest” of a specific resident. For example, in the case of pancreatic cancer the 
possibility of a cure is extremely rare. An objective medical decision dedicated to the 
curative approach would recommend radiation and chemotherapy as what is in the “best 
interest” of a patient. However, given the low success rate for that particular form of 
cancer and the side effects of treatment someone may reasonably choose to refuse 
treatment. While inconsistent with an objective medical decision, this decision is not 
inconsistent with the categorical imperative. That is, while Kant prohibits suicide there is 
not a prohibition against passive euthanasia. Therefore, in this case the “best interests” of 
the individual suffering with pancreatic cancer might be passive euthanasia.
 Another example which is actually based on the experience of my friend’s 
grandmother, who I will call Athena, further illustrates the error in assuming that the 
“best interest” standard is synonymous with an objective medical standard.  Athena is an 
elderly Greek woman who has practiced vegetarianism for over 60 years. In her late 
eighties she has become the victim of Alzheimer disease and as such suffers from 
cognitive impairments. She no longer eats very well and as result has become anemic. 
The decision was made that in her “best interest” she should be fed iron rich meat 
products. Her family was not consulted about this decision.  They were extremely 
disturbed to learn that their grandmother was being fed meat. Their annoyance with this 
decision was based on Athena’s life long belief that it is morally wrong to kill animals. 
 66
Obviously, in this case as in the previous example the determination of what is in the 
“best interest” of Athena goes beyond a medical determination of the best medical 
treatment. Therefore, in order to address the sensible realm of subjective choice the 
oversight committee must include professional, religious, and gender diversity.   
 It should also be noted that the committee is responsible to make sure that in 
determining the “best interest” of the resident they do not cross the line between 
respecting the subjective choices of a resident and adopting a paternalistic approach. 
Admittedly, this can be a difficult responsibility but is a necessary responsibility if the 
end formulation of the categorical imperative is to be upheld.    
Non-medical decision making also poses a problem for Kantian Meadows in 
terms of residents with limited rationality. In order to address this issue, Kantian 
Meadows will adopt the legal concept of the “reasonable person” standard. 
Reasonable Person Standard 
 Unlike the “best interest” standard, which is utilized within the medical context, 
the “reasonable person” standard is used within the legal context to determine the 
justifiability of a defendant’s actions. In other words, is a particular action one that a 
“reasonable person” would engage in? Within the context of Kantian Meadows the 
standard of a “reasonable person” will be employed in order to determine the 
reasonableness of non-medical subjective choices made by those residents who have 
limited autonomy. Such residents are those who lack the capacity for making medical 
decisions but have the ability to make choices in other areas. For example, the reader may 
recall the woman who chose not to wear her dentures. The job of the oversight committee 
is to apply the “reasonable person” standard in order to determine if her choice should be 
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respected over her daughters’ objections. The necessity of committee diversity becomes 
clearer if we consider Kim Scheppele’s (2004) discussion of the need for a “reasonable 
woman” standard in relation to the rape case Rusk v State (pp. 456-460). Scheppele 
argues, successfully I believe, that gender is a relevant factor in determining whether or 
not the victim consented to sexual intercourse. In this case Scheppele maintains that a 
“reasonable woman’s” perception of the circumstances leads to a different decision than a 
“reasonable person” standard with a male bias. In other words, the victim’s belief that her 
life was in danger is a reasonable belief from the perspective of the “reasonable woman” 
standard.  Schepple’s point is that historically the legal standard of a “reasonable person” 
has had a male bias. She argues that in the Rusk v State case the male perception of the 
circumstances were not necessarily the perception of a “reasonable woman.”  In other 
words, Schepple is suggesting that in rape cases the court should recognize that the 
criminal nature of a defendant’s conduct is sometimes dependent upon the victim’s point 
of view. Scheppele’s suggestion of a “reasonable woman” standard has been applied by 
the courts in sexual harassment and assault cases.  
 My point in referring to Schepple’s argument for a “reasonable woman” standard 
is to demonstrate the need for gender diversity as well as professional and religious 
diversity on the oversight committee. Admittedly, great difficulty is encountered in 
attempting to utilize any standard of substitute judgment. However, if Kantian Meadows 
is to keep its commitment to treat all residents as “if they were persons,” a substitute 
standard must be adopted. Although the “reasonable person” standard is not infallible, 
combining it with diversity in the oversight committee at least provides a legitimate 
method for determining the reasonableness of subjective choices by those with 
 68
diminished rationality. In addition, if the oversight committee is to be effective, the scope 
of proxy consent must be restricted to its original intent. 
Proxy Consent 
 In Chapter One I addressed the abuse of proxy consent that frequently occurs in 
the nursing home setting. That is, adult children who obtain proxy consent for their 
parents often use it to become dictators interfering and making decisions for every aspect 
of their parent’s life. The original intent of medical proxy consent was for the person with 
proxy consent to stand in the place of someone who lacked the cognitive capacity to 
make their own medical decisions. At Kantian Meadows, we will honor that original 
intent and go one step further. The oversight committee at Kantian Meadows will also 
review proxy consent decisions in relation to medical decisions to ensure that those 
decisions are in the “best interest” of the resident. This characteristic of Kantian 
Meadows distinguishes it from other American nursing homes because in most cases the 
decision of the person with proxy consent is accepted without question. Again I would 
like to remind the reader that the function of the oversight committee is not paternalistic 
in nature, but rather its goal in this case is to treat non-rational human beings as “if they 
were persons.”  Therefore, an oversight of decisions made by the person with proxy 
consent is necessary in order to prevent the resident form being treated as a “mere 
means.”  The discussion of the justification for restricting proxy consent having been 
completed, I will turn my discussion to the function of the pharmacists on the oversight 
committee. 
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Pharmaceutical Justification 
Many drugs used in the treatment of long term care residents may be used either 
to diminish or promote autonomy. For example, drugs like Haldol may be used to treat 
mental disorders but it can also cause confusion and hallucinations.  Drugs like ativan, 
depending on the prescribed dosage, may have a mild tranquilizing affect or be used as a 
chemical restraint. In light of Kantian Meadows commitment to avert obstacles to 
autonomy, it will be the responsibility of the pharmacists to review the prescribed 
medications of all residents to ensure drugs are not being prescribed in order to 
chemically restrain residents. 
 In addition, the oversight pharmacists will be responsible to review resident 
prescriptions to guarantee that there is not the possibility of confusion induced by drug 
interaction. I have attempted to demonstrate why the particular configuration and 
qualifications of the oversight committee have been chosen, I will now turn the 
discussion to the issue of treating a resident as a “mere means.” 
Avoiding Treating a Resident as a “Mere Means” 
 As has been previously argued treating a person as a “mere means” results from 
deception, manipulation or coercion. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure that these 
practices do not occur at Kantian Meadows. I contend that Kantian Meadows has gone 
along way in ending family manipulation and coercion by restricting the use of proxy 
consent. Kantian Meadows will also need a policy to address verbal and financial abuse 
of residents by family members. This policy must clearly state what counts as abuse and 
reporting requirements. In addition to addressing the issue of family treating residents as 
“mere means,” Kantian Meadows must examine its own policies and practices. 
 70
   I believe that a lot of nursing home practices that result in treating a person as a 
“mere means” are the result of inadequate staffing. In other words, understaffing creates 
an environment in which residents are viewed as tasks to be completed in a timely 
manner. For example, the previously mentioned practice of waking a resident up during 
the middle of the night for a shower or bath. The residents chosen for these midnight 
baths are always those who either cannot speak or suffer from some form of dementia. If 
we apply the categorical imperative, i.e., are we using the person as a “mere means?” I 
believe the answer must be YES. That is the case because I do not believe than someone 
would willingly agree to the practice without being coerced or manipulated.  Therefore, 
from a Kantian perspective the resident is being used as a “mere means.”  In light of this 
consideration, Kantian Meadows’ staffing levels will be determined based on the acuity 
level of the residents rather than on state and federal minimum requirements.  The 
difference is that under state guidelines a resident is entitled to so many hours of care per 
day. In Pennsylvania, for example, it is 2.3 hours of care per day. This level of staffing is 
determined in the following manner. The number of residents housed in a particular 
nursing home is divided by the number of staff in a twenty-four hour period. The 
resulting number must meet or exceed the state requirement. In practice this does at times 
equate to the following scenario. On a unit with 60 residents it is possible that 2 nursing 
assistants, one medication nurse, and one treatment nurse are left to provide all required 
care including feeding residents who are unable to feed themselves. Therefore, the dining 
room often resembles an assembly line in which one aide simultaneously feeds three or 
four residents. In light of Kantian Meadows commitment to the categorical imperative, 
our level of staffing will necessarily exceed state and federal staffing requirements. 
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 Kant also prohibits lying. Alzheimer residents present a significant challenge to 
this aspect of the end formulation of the categorical imperative. I have personally 
agonized over this particular issue for some time. When I was a certified nursing assistant 
working on the Alzheimer’s unit, I was instructed to orient the residents to reality. In 
other words, if a resident asks you, “Is the bus coming?” we were to answer truthfully. I 
often thought to myself that this was a ridiculous practice. The residents had their own 
reality and nothing I said could alter that fact. However, as I approach the issue from the 
perspective of this project, I believe that the answer is quite clear. In the case of 
Alzheimer residents, if we are to treat them “as if they were persons,” we must answer 
them in a truthful manner. Admittedly, some residents will become upset at the truth. 
However, to avoid the truth in order to prevent them from becoming upset is to adopt a 
paternalistic position which is clearly a violation of the duties imposed upon us by the 
end formulation of the categorical imperative. Therefore, at Kantian Meadows our policy 
is to be truthful with all our residents. 
 Restraints both physical and chemical create another area in which the potential 
for treating residents as “mere means” exists. In order to avoid this problem, the oversight 
committee must be diligent in ensuring that no form of restraint is employed for the 
benefit or convenience of the staff. For example, it is not permissible to restrain a resident 
because they are annoying the staff. In recent years the use of restraints has been severely 
restricted due to the numerous deaths that have resulted from the use of physical 
restraints. At Kantian Meadows the use of any form of restraint will be extremely rare 
and only approved after a complete investigation by the oversight committee. The above 
examples illustrate only a few examples of possible treatment of residents as “mere 
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means.” These examples are not in anyway intended to be exhaustive in terms of policies 
or practices that could result in the treatment of a resident as a “mere means.”  The last 
issue I wish to discuss is Kantian Meadows commitment to avert whenever possible 
obstacles to the possibility of autonomy. 
Obstacles to the Possibility of Autonomous Action 
 In Chapter Three we discussed, the lack of subsistence, security, and privacy as 
potential obstacles to the possibility of autonomous action. Within the context of the 
nursing home malnutrition can be equated with the lack of subsistence. “This is no way to 
live. I wish I were dead and buried”  (Burger, Kayser-Jones, & Bell, 2000).  This is a 
quote from a 76 year old man who died weighing 69 pounds in contrast to his ideal 
weight of 150 ponds. A study of malnutrition and dehydration undertaken by Burger, 
Kayser-Jones, and Bell in 2000 found the following: 
 Studies using a variety of measurements and performed over the last 
five to 10 years on different nursing home subgroups have shown that 
 from 35 percent to 85 percent of U.S. nursing home residents are 
 malnourished. Thirty to 50 percent are substandard in body weight (vii). 
In their conclusions they listed the following as contributing factors: 
  Structural factors within the nursing home setting that 
contribute to malnutrition and dehydration include lack of 
individualized care, inadequate staffing, high nurse aide turnover,  
and lack of  professional supervision of aides (viii). 
Again the issue of inadequate staffing plays a significant role not only in creating 
an environment with the potential for treating a resident as a “mere means,” but also one 
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in which the obstacle of a lack of subsistence is present. In light of Kantian Meadows 
commitment to the end formulation of the categorical imperative and the empirical 
evidence that inadequate staffing is contrary to the duties imposed by the categorical 
imperative, Kantian Meadows, as previously stated, will adopt an alternative staffing 
policy. 
 In addition to the obstacles created by the lack of subsistence, the threat of 
physical abuse also creates an obstacle to the possibility of autonomous action. Most of 
the threats of physical abuse come from nursing home staff. In an attempt to avert that 
possibility, Kantian Meadows will adopt a strict hiring policy. All potential employees 
will under go a criminal background check similar to the background check implemented 
by the public school systems. In other words, the background check will include federal 
as well as state criminal background checks. There will also be a ZERO tolerance policy 
in place and any suspected abuse will result in immediate suspension until an 
investigation can be completed. Further, all suspected abuse will be handed over to the 
local police for investigation. 
 Finally, Kantian Meadows will address the need for individual privacy as a means 
of personhood enhancement. While HIPPA provides legal protection for privacy in 
regard to medical information, Kantian Meadows will provide privacy in other areas 
where possible for all its residents. For example, the practice of drawing curtains and 
knocking on doors before entering will be rigorously enforced.  
Conclusion 
The goal of this project has been to identify the need for nursing home reform in 
terms of the treatment of nursing home residents. In furtherance of that goal I have 
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argued for the following thesis: Nursing homes are unethical in the strong philosophical 
sense of the term because they erode autonomy, personhood, and human dignity and the 
end formulation of the Kantian categorical imperative can provide a theoretical 
framework for creating a just nursing home. To develop that thesis I have argued for six 
distinct but inter-related propositions. 
 To recapitulate: In Chapter One I developed Propositions One and Two. That is, I 
argued that the structure and characteristics of American nursing homes create the 
potential for the objectification of nursing home residents. I defined objectification in 
relation to Nussbaum’s seven criteria: instrumentality, denial of autonomy, inertness, 
fungibility, violability, ownership, and denial of subjectivity. Next, based on an 
interdisciplinary literature review I argued that objectification is a moral evil. 
In Chapter Two I developed Proposition Three. Based on a critical examination of 
the care perspective as a possible theoretical framework for a just nursing home, I found 
the care perspective lacking in its ability to protect personhood and dignity. That 
conclusion was based on three characteristics of the care perspective. First, it fosters 
paternalism. Second, it erroneously assumes that face-to-face relationships result in a 
caring relationship. Lastly, its abandonment of the language of rights undermines human 
dignity. Finally, I argued that the “end formulation” of the categorical imperative can 
provide such a theoretical framework for the creation of a just nursing home. 
In Chapter Three, I developed Propositions Four and Five. That is, I argued based 
on an analogy with our indirect duty to refrain from cruelty to animals, that we have an 
indirect duty to treat non-rational human beings as if “they were persons.”  I then 
unpacked the “end formulation “of the categorical imperative to examine the duties it 
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imposes on us. I argued that not only do we have a duty not to treat persons as “mere 
means” but that we also have a duty to avert obstacles to the possibility of autonomous 
action. Therefore, a just nursing home has similar duties to its residents.  
Finally, in Chapter Four I developed Proposition Six and created, in theory, 
Kantian Meadows; a nursing home dedicated to the ethical treatment of the elderly and 
grounded in the categorical imperative.  One purpose of creating Kantian Meadows was 
an attempt to illustrate how a nursing committed to the ethical treatment of all its 
residents and grounded in the categorical imperative might be organized. Another 
purpose was to demonstrate the practical application of the categorical imperative in 
terms of what policies and procedures it might endorse and what policies and procedures 
it would necessarily reject. The policies and procedures I argued for were derived from 
the duties imposed upon us by the end formulation of the Kantian categorical imperative.  
I do not any claim that these suggestions are not without difficulty or that they are an 
exhaustive list of potential reforms. However, I do claim that a commitment to justice 
requires that we undertake such a reform. A reform which I will argue that must begin 
with a reassessment of our staffing requirement and a commitment to the ethical 
treatment of all nursing home residents. I believe that the fictional Kantian Meadows can 
provide a starting point for that reform. However, unfortunately it has been my 
experience that American nursing homes more closely resemble a General Motors 
assembly line than Kantian Meadows. From my perspective, this is problematic because 
human beings are not objects and therefore should never be treated as if they were 
objects. 
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